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“The aim of argument, or of discussion, should not be victory, but progress.” 
    Joseph Joubert (Pensées) 
 
Since the emergence of Sweden in the mid-1930s as ‘the middle way’, 
the Swedish Model has interested both social scientists and politicians. A 
strong welfare state, a powerful trade union movement, extensive 
equalisation of pay and incomes, and priority of full employment was 
seen as an example to follow and later as an extreme expression of 
European sclerosis. But adherents and critics of the model alike have 
shared one thing in common—an overriding interest in its practical 
aspects. Less attention has been paid, especially outside Sweden, to the 
theories behind or motivations for Swedish economic policies. In fact, it 
is easier to distinguish a Swedish model in theory than in practice. 
  At the beginning of the 1950s, two economists at LO (the Swedish 
TUC), Gösta Rehn and Rudolf Meidner,
1 devised a unique model for 
economic policy. Their exposition questioned the Keynesian policy of 
full employment while rejecting the non-interventionism and one-sided 
emphasis on price stability of the monetarists. What came to be known 
as the Rehn-Meidner model thus represented a ‘third way’ in economic 
policy. Among other things, Rehn and Meidner recommended labour 
market measures and deflationary fiscal policies to combine full 
employment with low rates of inflation. 
  Today, the common view among Swedish politicians and economists 
alike (also within LO) is that the Rehn-Meidner model is obsolete and 
the model is seldom mentioned in the economic policy debate. Yet the 
instruments of the model are still seen as appropriate tools of economic 
policy.  
  Labour market policies were practised full scale in Sweden—even by 
a non-socialist government—when unemployment escalated in the early 
1990s. From 1994 to 1998, the social democratic government applied an 
extreme version of the Rehn-Meidner model, combining an ambitious 
labour market policy with an exceptionally tight fiscal policy. Again in 
                                                 
1 Rudolf Meidner (1914—) was the head of the LO Economics Research Department 
and Gösta Rehn (1913—1996) the department’s most outstanding economist. Rehn 
had served as an expert on the committee that formulated the Swedish labour 
movement’s post-war programme in 1944. Both Rehn and Meidner had high 
academic qualifications and were well acquainted with the contemporary 




1999, the Social Democrats adopted a long-run target for fiscal policy 
that quite satisfies one of the principles of the model, namely, a surplus 
of public saving over the business cycle. Inflation targets defined in 
many OECD countries (including Sweden) since the early 1990s as 
means of creating stable macroeconomic conditions are clearly in the 
Rehn-Meidner spirit although mostly associated with a passive employ-
ment policy that is quite alien to their model.  
  In a wider context, the guidelines for employment policy set by the 
European Union conform to policy recommendations in the Rehn-
Meidner model. The Amsterdam Treaty of June 1997 states, like Rehn 
and Meidner, that an active employment policy must be pursued within a 
stable macroeconomic policy framework. Proposals for labour market 
policies at the Luxembourg meeting in November 1997 were clearly 
inspired by Swedish practice.  
  However, OECD recommendations of larger wage differentials 
between sectors to increase employment in countries like Sweden have 
no support in the Rehn-Meidner model. The model advocates small wage 
differentials between sectors, mainly on equity grounds but also to 
promote growth and price stability. The EU idea of a macroeconomic 
dialogue with social partners at the Cologne meeting in June 1999 with 
its emphasis on wage restraint to achieve price stability and 
competitiveness is not compatible with the model.  
  Erik Lundberg is the economist who has devoted the greatest amount 
of attention to the Rehn-Meidner model. His attitude was benevolent but 
critical. Lundberg was impressed by the logic of the model and by its 
penetrating discussion of the driving forces of inflation and structural 
change. He used the notion of a ‘Rehn-Salter model’ to demonstrate that 
the Rehn-Meidner model, by presuming that overall productivity is 
stimulated by pressures on profit margins, was a forerunner of neo-
classical vintage models (Lundberg, 1972, pp. 470-471). Lundberg’s 
objections to the Rehn-Meidner model were mainly political and 
ideological. He worried that labour-market policy and major public 
savings would cause the emergence of a bureaucratic control apparatus 
that in the long term would pose a threat to democracy. In economic 
terms, Lundberg’s chief objection to the Rehn-Meidner model was that it 
underestimated the importance of profits—both ex ante and ex post—for 
investments and growth (Lundberg, 1952, p. 67, 1972, pp. 480-485, and 
1985, p. 19).  
  Many Swedish economists today share Lundberg’s critical view of the 
Rehn-Meidner model. Labour market policy is regarded as an inefficient 




dampening (Calmfors, 1993a, Calmfors and Skedinger, 1995, and 
Lindbeck, 1997). Profit-squeezing policies and solidaristic wage policy, 
other essential elements of the model, are criticised on similar grounds, 
but also for having led to higher unemployment (Henrekson, Jonung and 
Stymne, 1996, and Lindbeck, 1997). Yet Swedish economists are 
generally more critical of the practice arising from the model than of the 
model per se.
2 
  The Rehn-Meidner model is both an economic (and wage) policy 
programme and a theory of wages, inflation, profits, employment and 
growth. Which of these two aspects of the model I am discussing at any 
given point will be obvious from the context. I shall begin by describing 
the content of the Rehn-Meidner economic policy programme—here 
seen as synonymous with the Swedish model (section 1). My notion of 
the Swedish model is therefore more specific than in earlier studies. 
  I then outline the positive theory behind the Swedish model with 
particular emphasis on wages, inflation, profits and structural change 
(section 2). Here, I contrast the Rehn-Meidner model to contemporary 
Keynesian views. A central theme of this work is that Rehn and Meidner 
were suspicious of incomes policy because their theory of inflation is 
fundamentally different from that of most Keynesians. I will also 
compare the Rehn-Meidner model with the so-called Scandinavian 
model since the models are sometimes confused in the literature. 
  My final focal point is on the theoretical validity of the Rehn-Meidner 
model (section 3) where some of its propositions about the working of 
labour and product markets and the performance of economic policies 
are related to later theoretical developments. In addition, I will survey 
the findings of some studies that have put hypotheses in the model to the 
test. In most cases, the comparisons show the model in a favourable light. 
  Let me now point to some limitations in my discussion. I will not trace the 
theoretical influences of the model, describe the phases of its development or 
the economic circumstances that shaped it. I will not analyse the division of 
labour between Rehn and Meidner or the possible influence of others upon the 
formulation of the model. The discussion between Rehn and Lundberg, which 
became an early highlight in Sweden’s economic policy debate in the post-war 
period, is not accounted for (see Turvey (ed.), 1952, and Erixon, 1997a). 
  Public sector growth and the principle of general welfare in policy 
making are not discussed for the simple reason that the Swedish model is 
                                                 
2 There are Swedish economists who show a friendly attitude to the Rehn-Meidner 
model (see Hibbs and Locking, 1995, Edin and Topel, 1997, Agell, 1999, and 





narrowly defined as the Rehn-Meidner model. Their model makes no 
reference to the priorities and means of social welfare policies. Further, 
Meidner’s proposal to the 1976 LO Congress concerning wage-earner 
funds is not treated as part of the Rehn-Meidner model. This is an 
exclusion based on purely practical considerations. One argument in 
support of the funds was to appropriate ‘excess profits’ from solidaristic 
wage policy. Marginal employment subsidies on the other hand, 
enthusiastically advocated by Rehn in the 1970s and the 1980s, are 
considered a component of the model.  
  There is no discussion of the applications of the Rehn-Meidner model 
in Sweden. Not only foreign but also Swedish scholars (see Lindbeck, 
1997, pp. 1291-1292) have sometimes exaggerated its importance as the 
rudder of Sweden’s economic policy. It is true that labour-market and 
solidaristic wage policy  would hardly have expanded to their current 
scope if Rehn and Meidner had not placed them in a larger economic and 
political context (Erixon, 1995, and Erixon, 1997a). But the Rehn-
Meidner model was not consciously applied in all respects, even in its 
‘golden age’ from the late 1950s to the mid-1970s. And while the decline 
in the profit share (of value added) in Swedish manufacturing agrees 
with the model, this decline was largely an international phenomenon. 
Besides, the social democratic government was hardly influenced by the 
model in the 1960s when it refused to counter the fall in profit shares 
with an accommodating economic policy (Erixon, 1987, pp. 51-54, and 
Erixon, 1995, p. 36).  
  Yet the Rehn-Meidner policy model is one of the few innovations in 
Swedish economics in the post-war period. I would even claim that the 
model is one of the few coherent visions of economic policy beyond 
Keynesianism. Hopefully I am able to impart something of its 
uniqueness and to fairly evaluate its relevance. My ambition is also to 
show the remarkable mix in the Swedish model between a market-
conform economic policy to satisfy national goals on the one hand and 
measures to mobilise and strengthen the position of labour on the other.  
  A further aim of the article is to call attention to some misconceptions 
and misrepresentations of the Swedish model among economists outside 
Sweden. Even friendly observers of Swedish labour market policies have 
failed to appreciate the scope of the Rehn-Meidner model where 
instruments and priorities of economic policy are concerned. Further, they 
have often placed the model in a trade union or bargaining theoretical 







1. The Content of the Rehn-Meidner Model  
 
I will define a Keynesian policy as a counter-cyclical fiscal and 
monetary policy (possibly including exchange-rate policies) with a bias 
toward expansionism to guarantee full employment and ad hoc measures 
to fight inflation. A more narrow definition of Keynesian policy will be 
avoided, for example one that emphasises the use of fiscal rather than 
monetary instruments to stabilise the economy in line with Keynes’ 
recommendations in the  General Theory (Keynes, 1936, p. 375). A 
similar priority of fiscal rather than monetary measures for stabilisation 
purposes is also found in the Rehn-Meidner model.  
  Rehn and Meidner published their criticisms of Keynesianism at the 
end of the 1940s when expansionary fiscal and monetary policies to 
achieve low rates of unemployment had led to high inflation in Sweden. 
They warned of the high costs even to the trade union movement of 
inflation and ‘overemployment’, pointing out that inflation has negative 
effects on resource allocation and growth, and that full employment 
achieved through excess demand would lead to high absenteeism, excess 
labour turnover and a greater risk of accidents at work. 
  A high demand for skilled labour and limited availability is a cause for 
wage drift, i.e., pay in excess of what has been negotiated in national 
(central) agreements.
3 Wage drift leads to compensation demands from 
other groups of employees anxious to maintain their relative wage 
positions. A Keynesian policy of full employment therefore aggravates 
the conflict between those wage earners who benefit from market forces 
and those who do not. The result is inflationary wage-wage spirals 
where, for example, ‘wage drifters’ try to preserve their initial wage 
advantage. Too expansive a general economic policy thus generates 
tensions between  different wage-earner groups that not only threaten 
cohesion within the labour movement but also lead to higher inflation. 
Inflation is a threat to distribution policy and Keynesianism has 
unpredictable and unintentional effects on the distribution of income and 
wealth. 
  Moreover, according to Rehn and Meidner, Keynesianism is itself a 
threat to full employment. An expansionary general economic policy 
causes inflation and deficits in the current account. These are problems 
calling for a contractionary policy, which in turn results in 
                                                 
3 National agreements are reached either for a particular industry or, by a process of 





unemployment. Full employment is also threatened in the long term by 
price and investment controls introduced to dampen overheating. Rehn 
and Meid-ner therefore wished to replace a Keynesian stop-go policy 
with a policy that permanently kept the rate of inflation under control. 
  Rehn and Meidner also thought that any measures other than a 
restrictive general economic policy to fight inflation and improve the 
balance of payments were ineffective or arbitrary. Inflation, they said, 
cannot be curbed by means of controls on prices and investments as in a 
Keynesian policy of full employment. Regulations can hardly be 
comprehensive and from the productivity viewpoint, it is often the 
‘wrong’ companies and sectors that suffer their effects.  
  Neither did they hold any great hopes that inflation in an overheated 
economy could be prevented by incomes policy, even one covering all 
the employee organisations. Rehn and Meidner came to the conclusion 
that incomes policy is ineffective in a boom and unnecessary in a 
recession. In addition, incomes policy is a threat to the redistribution 
policy of central trade unions. If statutory, it threatens the autonomy of 
labour market organisations.
4 The combination of high wage drift and 
‘voluntary’ incomes policy also undermined solidarity between trade 
unions and weakened their legitimacy in the eyes of their members. 
Clearly, declarations of ‘wage restraint’ are incompatible with the main 
task of a trade union, which is to achieve the highest possible pay rises 
for their members. 
  The two economists presented their alternative to Keynesianism in a 
report to the 1951 LO Congress entitled The Trade Union Movement and 
Full Employment (Meidner and Rehn et al, 1953). Hereafter I equate the 
Rehn-Meidner model with this LO report. The subsequent work of Rehn 
and Meidner did hardly add anything to their original model, with the 
exceptions of Rehn’s recommendation of marginal employment 
subsidies and Meidner’s proposal of wage earner funds. 
  A major objective of the Rehn-Meidner model is to combine full 
employment with price stability. The model also considers other 
economic policy objectives during the early post-war period, namely 
growth and equity. Means and objectives are shown in Figure 1.  
 
                                                 
4 In the Swedish case, statutory incomes policy was a threat to the ‘Saltsjöbaden 
spirit’. According to an agreement in Saltsjöbaden in 1938 between LO and SAF (the 
Swedish Employers’ Federation), labour market conflicts should be resolved through 





Figure 1: Means and objectives in the Rehn-Meidner economic and 
wage policy model 
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1.1.  A restrictive fiscal policy 
 
The model recommends a restrictive general economic policy, especially 
fiscal restraints, to curb the rate of inflation (arrow 1 in Figure 1). The 
main purpose of this tight fiscal policy—foremost an increase in indirect 
taxes—is to force down profits and profit margins in the business sector. 
Rehn and Meidner were convinced that profits are the significant driving 
force in the process of inflation. High profits lead to a substantial amount 
of wage drift, in  turn triggering demands for corresponding wage 
increases from groups that have not benefited from the effects of free 
market forces.  
  Rehn and Meidner did not exclude policy measures to dampen fluctu-
ations in the business cycle. Nevertheless, their basic idea was that the 
general economic policy should be predominantly tight over the cycle. 
This recommendation reflected a profound mistrust of the keynesian 
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strategy of fine-tuning to obtain both full employment and price stability, 
particularly with unemployment already low. 
  In the Rehn-Meidner model, a restrictive general economic policy is 
expected to encourage rationalisations and structural change (arrow 2 in 
Figure 1). Furthermore, the tight economic policy is to support the 
equity principles of the trade union movement by leading to smaller 
wage gaps between ‘wage drifters’ and other employees (arrow 3). More 
precisely, the policy reduces the risk of wages reflecting differences in 
profitability between firms rather than the content of work. Besides, the 
advocacy of a tight general economic policy over the business cycle is 
part of a long-run strategy to increase labour’s share of value added. To 
this we return in section 2.  
 
 
1.2.  Solidaristic wage policy 
 
The main task of a central trade union organisation in the Rehn-Meidner 
model is to pursue a solidaristic wage policy, the common denominator 
being that wages shall not be determined by company profitability. 
Identical work must be remunerated with the same rates of pay and wage 
differentials shall reflect real differences in work content, such as 
working conditions, difficulty, responsibility, experience and education 
required.  
  The solidaristic wage policy presupposes a systematic comparison of 
jobs by central (co-ordinated) trade unions, possibly in collaboration 
with central employer organisations, where the job evaluation has two 
components, the definition of identical jobs and the decision on a fair 
wage structure.  
  Thus, the wage policy of solidarity is both a policy of identical rates of 
pay for the same work and a policy of fair wage differentials. Politicians and 
economists, even in Sweden, often disregard this latter aspect of solidaristic 
wage policy (cf. Blanchflower, Jackman and Saint-Paul, 1995, pp. 88-89, 
and Uddén-Jondal, 1993, p. 4). The Rehn-Meidner model is  not a 
recommendation of wage equalisation in general. A clear distinction must be 
made between the theory and practice of solidaristic wage policy.
5  
  Neither should the solidaristic wage policy be confused with trade unions’ 
                                                 
5 Low-paid groups were favoured in co-ordinated negotiations in Sweden from the 
mid-1960s to the early 1980s. This policy of wage equalisation did not follow 
directly from the principle of fairness in the Rehn-Meidner model. But LO argued 
that the policy indirectly satisfied the ideal of solidaristic wage policy—wage 




strivings for compensation for wage drift because of relative wage 
preferences. The wage norm of solidarity is set after a comparison of jobs by 
central bodies in the labour market, not by wage earners in the leading sector. 
  Solidaristic wage policy can be seen as a rather blunt instrument of 
planning, typical of the early post-war period. It is nevertheless a policy 
aimed at simulating a long-run equilibrium in competitive labour 
markets. Here, the same wages are paid to homogenous labour and wage 
differentials are explained by differences in competence and jobs, inter 
alia their degree of (un)pleasantness. This wage principle, adopted 
already by LO in the 1930s, is governed by a concern for equity (arrow 
4). Rehn’s and Meidner’s contribution was to show that the principle 
also has implications for growth and price stability. 
  Rehn and Meidner considered solidaristic wage policy as a means of 
stimulating national growth, primarily through structural change (arrow 
5). Let us assume that the principle of solidarity means that wages in all 
firms are adjusted to the median level in a particular sector or in the 
whole economy. Coupled to a restrictive general economic policy, this 
wage policy should lead to the obliteration of the least profitable firms 
and sectors. Lower profits will create the incentives and release the 
resources for structural change. At the same time, solidaristic wage 
policy leads to ‘excess profits’ in the firms and sectors able to pay more 
than the solidarity wage. These profits will increase the financial 
prerequisites of expansion and strengthen the motivation to set up new 
firms and transfer resources to dynamic sectors. Hence, larger profit 
differences and more closures will speed up the expansion of fast-
growing sectors. 
  This expansion  of fast-growing sectors because of solidaristic wage 
policy will increase national (total factor) productivity growth. 
Resources will be transferred from low-productivity sectors to high-
productivity ones and firms that exhibit low productivity will either be 
forced into closure or to engage in rationalisations. 
  The Rehn-Meidner model freed the trade union movement from the 
straitjacket of incomes policy, particularly in an overheated economy. 
Government carries the main responsibility for the general level of 
wages, while the trade union movement is responsible for pay structure. 
Yet, as indicated above, it would be a simplification to say that the Rehn-
Meidner model ignores the effects of stabilisation policy on wage and 
industrial structure. The model also assumes that the wage structure 
influences the rate of inflation.  
  One aim of solidaristic wage policy is to bring down inflation both by 




and by countering the demands for compensatory wage increases that 
have no rational foundation (arrow 6). As already noted, the object of 
solidaristic wage policy is not to increase the intensity and scope of 
collective pay increases to preserve or improve a relative wage position. 
Rather, the aim is to prevent the inception of wage compensation spirals. 
In the absence of challenging wage differences, compensation demands 
for other groups’ pay rises or higher wages is less intense. Thus, a 
determination of fair wages should prevent inflationary wage drift and 
compensatory leapfrogging (Meidner and Rehn et al, 1953, p. 96, and 
Rehn, 1980, pp. 36 and 39-40).
6 
  Wage solidarity policy by itself is a poor instrument in the fight for 
equity and price stability, according to Rehn and Meidner. The 
incentives for dynamic firms to offer higher wages are not really affected 
by solidaristic wage policy. In fact, this policy will even increase the 
room for wage drift, ceteris paribus, since it leads to ‘excess profits’ in 
the most profitable firms. A solidaristic wage policy can therefore only 
contribute to lower wage drift if combined with a restrictive general 
economic policy and a mobility-enhancing labour market policy. 
 
 
1.3.  Labour market policy 
 
A restrictive general economic policy will cause unemployment  in some 
sectors of the economy. Rehn’s and Meidner’s main recommendation for full 
employment was therefore labour market policy measures (arrow 7). Labour 
market policy would also counter the tendency towards ‘structural 
unemployment’ that is bound to appear in the wake of a solidaristic wage 
policy. 
  The labour market policy measures can be divided into three parts: 
selective demand policy, supply-oriented measures, and actions to 
improve the matching process on the labour market. Demand-oriented 
measures should have the smallest possible effects on aggregate product 
demand and therefore be directed towards specific employee groups, 
firms and regions (particularly specific relief work and regional policy). 
The supply side of the labour market was to be affected by the 
introduction of relocation and retraining grants and of occupational 
training. The matching of job applicants to vacancies would be achieved 
                                                 
6 However, solidaristic wage policy may threaten price stability by forcing marginal 
companies with mark-up possibilities that have neither the capacity nor the will to 





through public employment service agencies.  
  The objective of the supply-side and matching measures was to 
increase or reallocate the availability of labour and to improve the labour 
market’s ability to make adjustments. Thus, labour market policy would 
stimulate economic growth by facilitating recruitment of labour in 
dynamic sectors (arrow 8). 
  Labour market policy is an important weapon in the struggle against 
inflation. Here, Rehn and Meidner emphasised not only that the 
alternative employment policy, i.e. an expansionary general economic 
policy, is inflationary, but also that some labour market policy measures 
have a direct inflation-dampening effect (arrow 9). Stimulation of labour 
mobility would moderate the rate of pay increases in sectors with high 
demand and labour shortage bottlenecks. An aim of labour market 
policies is also to reduce inflation by squeezing profit margins in the 
medium and long term (see 2.6). 
  In addition, labour market policy in the Rehn-Meidner model is a 
vehicle in the endeavour for equity. The significant wage differentials 
between sectors that emerge when dynamic firms try to attract labour 
with higher wages can be offset by measures to improve the mobility of 
labour from stagnating to expanding sectors (arrow 10). Hence, such 
government measures facilitate a solidaristic wage policy (Meidner and 
Rehn et al 1953, p. 97, and Meidner, 1969, p. 190). 
  Rehn and Meidner considered labour market policies, and marginal 
employment subsidies, as examples of selective employment policies. 
Conceptually, they did not deny that some selective employment policies 
are damaging to growth (Rehn, 1982, pp. 11-12), but ad hoc measures to 
support stagnating firms and sectors are peripheral elements of the Rehn-
Meidner model. Selective employment policy shall primarily favour 
dynamic firms, either by direct subsidies or by reductions in their 
recruitment and training costs.  
 
 
1.4.  Public saving 
 
Rehn and Meidner argue for public saving in the medium and long term. 
Public saving is an intermediate goal in their model. One of the purposes 
of a restrictive fiscal policy is to increase public saving over the business 
cycle (arrow 11 in Figure 1). In particular, fiscal policies should increase 
the public share of total saving at the expense of company saving by 
reducing profit margins (Rehn, 1952, pp. 52-54). 




distribution (see arrow 12). They also consider it preferable from the 
viewpoint of achieving certain employment and growth ambitions in the 
field of industrial and commerce policy (arrows 13 and 14 respectively). 
Besides, public saving is seen as a financial source of labour market 
policies and other selective measures.   
  According to Rehn and Meidner, large public surpluses during a boom 
will also increase the degree of freedom in stabilisation policy. These 
surpluses make it possible to avoid significant borrowing when fiscal 
policy becomes more expansive in a recession. 
 
 
1.5.  Marginal employment subsidies 
 
Through labour market policy, expansive firms are relieved of some of the 
cost of recruiting and up-grading labour. Wage drift is limited and price 
increases are counterbalanced in sectors with labour shortage and high 
product demand. Rehn wanted to combine labour market policies with 
financial supports to expansive firms to obtain an immediate inflation-
dampening effect. He  hoped that marginal employment subsidies would 
increase employment by creating incentives to reduce prices. Thus, the 
subsidies were considered by Rehn as one stone to kill two birds, 
unemployment and inflation (arrows 15 and 16 respectively). The proposal 
assumes that firms act on competitive markets or set their prices on the 
basis of marginal costs in markets with imperfect competition (see 2.1).  
  Rehn made no original contribution to the theory of marginal 
employment subsidies, but he did place the subsidies into a broader 
stabilisation-policy framework. In fact, marginal employment grants 
induced Rehn to suggest a modification of the Rehn-Meidner model when 
unemployment rose in Western Europe in the late 1970s. Here, he 
recommended the use of marginal  employment subsidies together with 
traditional labour market programmes and measures aimed at  raising 
effective demand. This kind of economic policy would have brought the 
rate of inflation down lower than a purely keynesian strategy for full 
employment (Rehn, 1982, pp. 3, 8, 18 and 26). Further, Rehn suggested in 
the 1980s that marginal supports should be offered not only to firms that 
recruit labour but also to investments and to production increases in 
general. 
  The notion of a selective employment policy in the Rehn-Meidner model 
may give the false impression that this policy is always directed towards 
specific firms, regions, sectors or wage-earner groups. But marginal 




for all kinds of labour, as recommended in Rehn’s final proposal. It is the 
conditional character of marginal subsidies—since only offered to 
recruiting firms—that make them selective and therefore distinct from 





1.6.  The uniqueness of the Rehn-Meidner model 
 
 
Hopefully I have uncovered the radical elements of the Rehn-Meidner 
model. At the height of the age of Keynesianism, in a country in the 
vanguard of the Keynesian revolution, within a social movement 
(reformist labour) that strongly emphasised full employment, Rehn and 
Meidner made bold to recommend a restrictive general economic policy 
and placed the priority of price stability on an equal footing with the 
priority of full employment. The provocative character of their model is 
illustrated by its conclusion that employment policies must have the 
smallest, not the largest, positive effects on aggregate demand. 
  The conclusion that the Keynesian model is more applicable in a 
recession and the Rehn-Meidner model in an overheated economy is a 
fairly obvious one. The fact that the Rehn-Meidner model was 
formulated during the early post-war boom was an important 
determinant of its character. Labour market policy, including regional 
policy, was intended to eliminate the ‘islands of unemployment’ 
resulting from a restrictive general economic policy and a solidaristic 
wage policy.  
  Rehn and Meidner were not against a traditional Keynesian public 
deficit policy in periods of deep recession or a counter-cyclical policy in 
general. But fiscal policy shall be predominantly restrictive in the 
business cycle, not only to conceive a public saving surplus for 
distributive (and industrial-policy) reasons but also to set the framework 
for stabilisation  policy. The model’s advocacy of a tight fiscal policy 
goes beyond a qualified Keynesian recommendation that expansionary 
measures should be cautiously used, or even replaced by fiscal and 
monetary restraints, near full employment.   
  Rehn and Meidner also argued that employment policy measures that 
                                                 
7 A similar condition can justify seeing public employment services as selective 






have inflation-dampening effects must be stressed even in periods of 
recession. Indeed, the Rehn-Meidner model breathes a profound fear of 
starting an inflation spiral. But the Rehn-Meidner model is also unique in 
terms of its comprehensive view of economic policy. 
  First, one of the model’s great advantages is that it embraces all the 
objectives of post-war economic policy—full employment, price 
stability, growth and equity. Modern macroeconomic models consider at 
most two objectives, often price stability and full employment.  
  Second, the Rehn-Meidner model deviates from most macroeconomic 
models by allotting at least two tasks to each instrument as illustrated by 
Figure 1. For instance, labour market policy has four objectives, to 
achieve full employment, to speed up structural change, to hold back 
price and wage increases caused by labour market bottlenecks or high 
profit margins, and to facilitate solidaristic wage policy. In the model, 
labour market policy has a further redistribution task—full employment 
shall alter functional income distribution in favour of labour by 
increasing its negotiation strength, both collectively and individually 
(Rehn, 1952, p. 47). 
  Third, the instruments of the Rehn-Meidner model are comple-
mentary. I have not in mind here that some measures must be introduced 
in the model to alleviate the side effects of other measures. (For 
example, a restrictive economic policy and a solidaristic wage policy 
will generate unemployment unless complementary labour market policy 
measures are introduced.) A partial application of the model is also 
discouraged by the fact that some measures are effective only when used 
together with other measures. The trade union movement can only 
pursue a solidaristic wage policy if labour market policy measures and a 
restrictive general economic policy are in place to keep wage drift under 
control. Further, labour market policy might be a necessary condition for 
a relationship between a solidaristic wage policy and  structural 
change
__labour resources are released through solidaristic wage policy, 
but labour market policy may be needed to transfer resources to 
expanding firms and sectors. Fair wages through solidaristic wage policy 
will not significantly restrain inflation unless a restrictive economic 
policy and a labour market policy are launched simultaneously. Rehn 
and Meidner also claim that labour market policy can neither fight 
inflation efficiently nor increase wage earners’ share of GDP if not 
combined with a restrictive general economic policy. This proposition is 
questioned in subsection 2.6.  
  Fourth, the Rehn-Meidner model has the advantage of linking together 




and monetary policies all influence growth. Here, the model avoids the 
one-sided Keynesian view of a positive relationship between profit and 
demand on the one hand and productivity growth on the other. Rehn and 
Meidner did not deny that a restrictive general economic policy might 
reduce productivity growth if private investments are hampered or if 
static scale advantages exist (Rehn, 1982, pp. 4-5). But according to their 
model, a restrictive economic policy may quite simply result in higher 
productivity growth through rationalisation and structural change. 
  Rehn’s and Meidner’s economic policy model is ingenious in its logic 
and all-embracing character. Indeed, there is no real counterpart in 
macroeconomics to their consistently holistic view and the model is 
easily appreciated in its own right, even by people with other political 




2.  The economic theory of the Swedish Model 
 
The positive theories underlying Rehn’s and Meidner’s policy model 
have already been presented. What remains is to give a more detailed 
description of the theories of wages, inflation and structural change and 
to adopt a more critical approach. When describing the Rehn-Meidner 
theory of wages and inflation, I will emphasise the strategic role of  
companies’ competition for labour and of relative wage preferences. The 
theory explains Rehn’s and Meidner’s  sceptical view of incomes policy 
as a mean to control wage developments. I will pay a particular interest 
to the Rehn-Meidner theory of profits since they claim that profits must 
be squeezed to obtain price stability. Finally, I will highlight the 
importance of push factors and relative profitability for structural change 
in the Rehn-Meidner model.  
  The easiest way to put the Rehn-Meidner theories into perspective is 
to compare them with other theories, especially those formulated by the 
economists behind the Scandinavian model and by Keynesian 
economists. Comparisons are complicated by the fact that the Keynesian 
theoretical tradition is heterogeneous and by some ambiguities in the 
Rehn-Meidner theories, but the areas of ambiguity should not be 
exaggerated. The main weakness in the Rehn-Meidner model is that 
some of the arguments are implicit or open to various interpretations, not 






2.1.  Profits and wage drift 
 
In the General Theory and the post-Keynesian tradition, nominal wages 
are given or determined by institutional and sociological factors 
(Keynes, 1936, pp. 13-15, Kaldor, 1957 and 1959, Kalecki, 1965, 
Harcourt and Kenyon, 1976, and Appelbaum, 1979). A similar 
assumption of exogenous (and sticky) nominal wages is often made in 
the (U.S) new-Keynesian theory. There are Keynesian models in which 
nominal wages are determined by economic circumstances, but mostly 
the relations are indirect only. For instance, labour’s bargaining strength 
is influenced by the rate of unemployment in some Keynesian models. In 
the Rehn-Meidner model, wages are basically determined by economic 
forces, primarily profits and profit margins.   
  The 1951 LO report does not state why profits are of central 
importance in wage formation or describe the relation between profits 
and profit margins. But Rehn explains himself in an article on the causes 
of wage drift in Swedish manufacturing written together with Bent 
Hansen in the mid-1950s (Hansen and Rehn, 1956). In that article, 
changes in nominal wages are profoundly determined by changes in 
labour demand and supply. In fact, Rehn and Hansen present a marginal 
productivity theory; wages are determined by the product of prices and 
physical marginal productivity (marginal value productivity) when 
labour supply is fixed. The economy is one of perfectly competitive 
markets or of exogenous (and flexible) prices, but Rehn and Hansen 
make an adjustment for the degree of monopoly.
8 
                                                 
8  The Rehn-Hansen theory of wage drift can be shown by a labour-market model 
where labour supply is given and firms are using two inputs, variable labour (L) and 
fixed capital (C). Firms are assumed to maximise profits given the production 
function Y= f (L,C) where Y is output. The marginal product of labour  is assumed to 
be positive (f’>0) and diminishing (f’’<0). Aggregate wages demanded by firms 
(WD) is then WD = P f’ (L) / (1+m (Ym)) where P is producer prices, Ym is output in 
the sector with imperfect competition and m the degree of monopoly. (Aggregation 
problems are ignored here.) The degree of monopoly (m) is a function of output, but 
the possibility of an exogenous m is not excluded. m is either 0 (in the competitive 
case) or determined as a Lerner index by the price elasticity of demand h, where m = 
1/h. h is negative, hence the demand curve has a negative slope when competition is 
imperfect. A rise in m (identical to a reduction in h) will, ceteris paribus, reduce 
product demand, and consequently, labour demand. But labour demand is raised by 
higher actual profits in my interpretation of the Rehn-Meidner model (see above). 
The possibility is excluded in the benchmark (Rehn-Hansen) model by the 
assumptions that the capital stock is fixed and that all labour is variable. In an 
extended model, wages demanded by firms can be seen as a positive function of 




Figure 2: Labour-demand shifts in a competitive labour market 
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The focus is upon marginal profits in the Rehn-Hansen article. Their 
fundamental theory simply says that wage drift is determined by the 
anticipated gain from employing more workers at the initial wage. The 
theory is shown in Figure 2.  
  W is the money wage rate and L the quantity of labour in the figure. 
Rehn and Hansen assume that physical marginal productivity is 
diminishing and the degree of monopoly constant; the demand curves in 
Figure 2 will then slope downward. They also assume that labour supply 
is (completely) inelastic. 
  Higher product demand or an increase in physical marginal 
productivity will shift the labour-demand curve outward from D to D’ 
                                                                                                                                     
employment (p/L) with a lag. (The assumption of a lagged relationship between p/L 
and WD is reasonable but it also makes it easier to distinguish between the effects of 
actual and marginal profits.) Actual profits in turn can be determined by m and P f' in 
the same period. Thus,  labour demand is raised by a higher  m, in spite of the 
negative product-demand effects, since the greater possibilities for firms to self-
finance investments and wage increases for indispensable labour become decisive 
(see above). Solidaristic and labour market policy arguments can be accounted for by 
defining a labour supply function with wage-setting elements. 
  The Rehn-Hansen wage-drift model can easily be extended to a stock-flow 
model by an assumption that the labour market will never clear because of repetitive 
macroeconomic shocks or the existence of heterogeneous workers and jobs (cf. 
Schager, 1988b).  A demand component such as the number of announced vacancies 
(in relation to employment) can be treated as a function of Pf' and p/L. In the stock-
flow model, labour market policy will affect the number of job applicants and the 





and therefore lead to higher nominal wages.
9 The equilibrium wage level 
increases from W1 to W2.  Total marginal profits from hiring more 
labour at the initial wage rate W1 is shown by the shadowed area in 
Figure 2. 
  Erik Lundberg criticised the Rehn-Meidner wage theory for 
ignoring the decisive role of labour market conditions for nominal 
wages. Lundberg’s view seems to be confirmed by Rehn’s theoretical 
approach in the article he wrote with Hansen. But Rehn and Hansen 
gave profits an independent position in relation to labour demand at 
the determination of wage drift. This separation is not explained by 
the obvious fact that marginal profits are determined by changes in 
both labour demand and labour supply (which in fact is given in 
Rehn’s and Hansen’s article, see Figure 2). Neither is the distinction 
between (expected) profit and (expected) labour-demand determinants 
in the Rehn-Hansen paper explained by the use of any other 
theoretical notion of profit than the marginal one. Hence, the 
separation is not based on a theory that actual profit margins or profits 
matter for wage drift. Instead, Rehn and Hansen divide total marginal 
profits from hiring more labour into an excess-profit and an excess-
demand effect (Hansen and Rehn, 1956, pp. 93-94). 
  Rehn’s and Hansen’s separation between excess-profit and excess-
demand effects on wage drift is a doubtful one within the framework of 
the marginal productivity theory.
10 Moreover, the practical difficulties of 
distinguishing between the excess-demand and the excess-profit 
hypotheses are overwhelming. 
                                                 
9 A shift downward in aggregate product demand will lead to price reductions even 
in the case of imperfect competition since it is assumed that the degree of monopoly 
(and therefore the  mark-up) is constant and the marginal product of labour is 
diminishing. 
10 Rehn and Hansen seem to assume that the slope of the labour demand curve may 
change due to structural changes in the production function. As a consequence, 
excess profits and excess demand can even move in opposite directions (Hansen and 
Rehn, 1956, p. 93). Yet, it is difficult to see how a change in the slope of the labour-
demand curve can move excess demand and excess profits in different directions if 
we still assume that marginal  productivity is diminishing. Rehn and Hansen  also 
refer to the more realistic cases of a wage rigidity downward and labour rationing 
(Hansen and Rehn, 1956, pp. 95-96). In the first case, marginal excess-profit effects 
on nominal wages are absent while excess-demand effects still exist when the labour 
demand curve shifts downward. In the case of labour rationing the excess-demand 
effect is absent while the excess-profit effect is positive. However, it seems strange 
to assume any effects on nominal wages at all in the case of wage rigidity or to 
eliminate the excess-demand effects in the case of labour rationing. 




I will regard the theory that wage drift is determined by expected profits 
from hiring more labour as the sole Rehn-Meidner theory of marginal 
productivity. Thus, I emphasise total marginal profits rather than the 
subset of marginal excess profits as in the Rehn-Hansen article. With this 
interpretation of the Rehn-Meidner model, it is not legitimate to include 
measures of both profit (margins) and labour-market conditions in the 
wage-drift function.
11 
  There is much to indicate, however, that both the LO report and the 
Rehn-Hansen article made another interpretation of the connection 
between profits and wages than the one in marginal productivity theory. 
The actual profit margin is not only an approximation of marginal profits, 
but also an important driving force in and of itself (cf. Meidner and Rehn, 
1953 et al, pp. 92-93, and Hansen and Rehn, 1956, p. 89). A theory that 
actual profits matter for wage drift is particularly important for a 
stabilisation-policy model that includes marginal employment subsidies 
(see below). 
  I shall suggest two possible arguments for  a relationship between 
actual profits and wage drift, both of which, in the spirit of the Rehn-
Meidner model, have firms—and their managers—as the main actors (cf. 
Rehn, 1952, p. 77).  
  In the first line of argument, an increase in firms’  self-financing 
capacity will stimulate labour demand. One possible mechanism is that 
high actual profits lead to more investment and therefore to a stronger 
demand for labour, since the firms’ capital costs will be reduced by self-
financing. Similar theories of a relationship between profits, internal 
saving and investment can be found in the Keynesian literature. But 
                                                 
11 Rehn and Hansen consider physical labour productivity as a third wage-drift 
determinant beside profit margins and labour shortage. They presume that wage drift 
is stimulated by increases in labour productivity irrespective of changes in labour 
demand, thus by increases in average productivity regardless of changes in marginal 
productivity. Earnings under piece-work will increase irrespective of labour market 
conditions at higher intensity of work or at technical improvements which will 
benefit employees as an 'institutional habit' (Hansen and Rehn, 1956, pp. 89-90 and 
96-97). There is difficulty, both in theory and practice, in separating these hypotheses 
from one that says that wage drift is stimulated by higher average profits or higher 
actual profit margins (see above). In addition, by the reference to ‘institutional habit’, 
the Rehn-Hansen theory becomes similar to the wage bargaining theory, a theory 
considered to be an alternative to the Rehn-Meidner model in my work. 
  There is a further argument for a separate labour productivity argument in the 
wage-drift function if mark-up pricing prevails and prices are based on  average 
costs. Product demand will now be stimulated by price reductions due to lower 
average costs. Subsequently, I will assume that firms set their prices based on 




Rehn and Meidner presumably thought of a second mechanism. A 
stronger financial position would intensify  non-investing firms’ 
competition for labour. High actual profits improve the financial 
opportunities of non-investing firms to keep indispensable employees. 
This allows them to deflect the threat of losing staff to recruiting firms 
by offering higher wages. Non-investing firms will be particularly 
anxious to make such offers if their existence literally stands or falls with 
the loss of valuable employees, i.e. no marginal productivity can be 
attributed to them (the labour demand curve is inelastic). The 
contribution to wage drift of static firms will speed up the elimination of 
dynamic firms’ gain from investments and labour recruitment.  
  The second hypothesis about a positive relationship between profits 
and nominal wages (beyond the marginal productivity theory) is based 
on the concept of X-inefficiency. The theory makes no assumptions about 
investment costs or non-investing firms’ possibilities of competing for 
labour with investing firms. According to the X-inefficiency theory, 
efficiency will decline in firms with high historical profitability. Among 
other things, management will award themselves and certain employees 
higher wages than their efforts merit. It is assumed that in good times 
firms will be more careless with offering higher wages, probably both to 
‘wage drifters’ and to wage earners covered by collective agreements.
12 
Further, high profits may raise the financial capacity of firms to pay X-
inefficient wages to their employees. 
  In the X-inefficiency case, average profits are not arguments in a 
labour demand function as in the first theory. Consequently, both profits 
and labour market conditions must be included in a wage drift equation 
representing the Rehn-Meidner model.
13 
  A hypothesis that higher profits will create financial resources for 
investment or for competition with investing firms may  be compatible 
with perfect competition in product markets. An increase in prices or 
(marginal) productivity will lead to disequilibrium profits before wages 
                                                 
12 Labour market conditions may influence collective wages, especially at the level of 
the firm. But I will treat collective wage increases on the company level as wage drift 
in accordance with the practice of Swedish statistics  (cf. Nilsson, 1994, pp. 8-9).  
 
13 The X-inefficiency interpretation of the Rehn-Meidner model is supported by 
Rehn’s and Hansen’s statement that high profits make employers more careless with 
regard to wage payments. Rehn and Hansen added that high profits make individual 
employees more eager to exploit the wage-paying capacity of companies (Hansen 
and Rehn, 1956, p. 89). However, the latter hypothesis breaks with the basic idea in 
the Rehn-Meidner model that companies are the main actors behind a positive 
relationship between profits (marginal or actual) and wage drift. 




are adjusted (see section 2.5 below). But the theory of X-inefficiencies is 
irreconcilable with an assumption of a highly competitive economy.  
  To summarise, both marginal and actual profits seem to matter for 
wage drift in the Rehn-Meidner model. I have suggested two 
explanations of why wage drift is influenced by actual profits, both of 
which remain  true to the spirit of the model in their underlying 
assumption that firms initiate wage increases. One, high profits may 
tempt firms to offer higher wages without any indication of a higher 
product demand or a better labour performance (see the X-inefficiency 
theory). Alternatively, larger financial endowments will increase the 
capability of firms to make investments or keep indispensable personnel 
who threaten to quit. The latter explanation is compatible with the theory 
that labour market conditions are decisive for wage drift.  
  I am ignoring for the time being the immense practical problems of 
discriminating between the marginal and average theories of wage drift, 
especially if the marginal notion is approximated with a measure of 
actual profits or profit margins. But a hypothesis that actual profits matter 
for wage drift is not only a possible addition to the marginal productivity 
theory; it must also be emphasised in the Rehn-Meidner model to avoid the 
awkward conclusion that marginal employment subsidies are inflationary.  
  The case for the Rehn-Meidner policy model is weakened if wage 
drift, in accordance with the Rehn-Hansen article, primarily is deter-
mined by marginal profits. A sizeable marginal employment subsidy will 
lead to a sizeable reduction in marginal costs but to a limited fall only in 
average costs (at given nominal wages). Significant wage drift will then 
occur not only in competitive but also in non-competitive product 
markets. (I assume throughout the analysis that the product-supply curve 
slopes upward in the short run.) In economies of monopoly competition, 
a marginal subsidy will stimulate labour demand (and output) if firms, in 
accordance with profit maximization behaviour, set their prices on the 
basis of marginal costs.
14 A marginal subsidy will also result in wage drift in 
oligopolistic markets where subsidised firms are price leaders and decide their 
prices on marginal costs.
15 The subsidy will also lead to wage drift in exposed 
                                                 
14 In this economy, producers have a monopoly position in segmented markets but 
they compete with each other by marketing product substitutes. Positive profits are 
assumed to be eliminated in the long run by entry. 
 
15  However, the positive labour-demand effects in markets with imperfect 
competition may be relatively small if the price elasticity of demand is a negative 
function of output. (See, for instance, the case of a linear demand curve.) A higher 
output is then associated with a higher profit margin (mark up) which,  ceteris 





sectors where prices are given for subsidised firms due to intense competition 
or foreign price leadership.  
  Let us compare the wage-drift effects of a marginal employment subsidy 
with those of a general employment subsidy; for instance, a general 
reduction of pay-roll taxes. The subsidies are supposed to be of the same 
amount and financed in the same way and by other taxes than on firms and 
wages.
16  
  Marginal costs will then be reduced more by a marginal than by a 
general subsidy. In consequence, the increase in labour demand will be 
larger in the marginal-subsidy case. Hence, the wage effect is stronger in 
this case if wage drift primarily is determined by marginal profitability. 
It is still assumed that firms set prices as a mark up over marginal costs 
in markets with imperfect competition.
17 
  If supporters of the Rehn-Meidner model accept that marginal 
profitability is decisive for wage drift, they must combine marginal 
subsidies with large labour-mobility enhancing programmes or fiscal 
restraints to avoid overheating in labour markets.
18 The model is shown 
                                                 
16 Hence, m (N2 – N0) = a N1, where m is the marginal subsidy and a the average 
subsidy. N0 is the initial employment level, N2 the employment level with the marginal 
subsidy and N1 the level with the average subsidy. It follows from the equality and the 
assumptions above that N0<N1<N2 (cf. Johnson and Layard, 1986, pp. 946-949). 
 
17 My analysis is more general than that in Layard (1979) and Layard and Nickell 
(1980). According to Layard and Nickell, the differences in output and employment 
between marginal and general subsidies will not appear in a closed economy. The 
stronger immediate output and employment effects of a marginal subsidy reflect that 
companies are predominantly price takers in the exposed sector and that 
monopolistic companies decide their prices on marginal costs to a larger degree in 
export markets than in home markets (Layard and Nickell, 1980, pp. 57 and 59). 
  
18  In the early 1980s, Rehn did not exclude the possibility, highlighted by some 
economists, that marginal employment premiums may lead to high wage drift (Rehn, 
1982, pp. 21, 36 and 40). His counter-argument was that other methods of raising 
employment would lead to higher inflation. Rehn claimed that a reduction in general 
pay-roll taxes and a marginal subsidy of an equal amount have the same immediate 
effects on employment, but that the general subsidy will lead to higher profits and 
therefore to higher inflation. Here, Rehn was strongly influenced by the conclusions 
for a closed economy in Layard (1979) and Layard and Nickell (1980), but also by 
other bargaining theories claiming that wage increases are induced by high average 
profits. Rehn also met the objections that marginal subsidies would result in high 
wage drift by arguing that the subsidies should be targeted to disadvantaged groups 
in the labour market. A similar argument cannot be used in the case of those 
‘general’ subsidies to all companies that became Rehn’s final proposal. Moreover, 
such targeted supports have only modest effects on employment and prices both in 




in a more favourable light if high actual profits rather than high marginal 
profits primarily cause wage drift. In that case, a marginal employment 
subsidy would initiate less wage drift than a general subsidy by the same 
amount.   The reduction in average wage cost is more modest with a 
marginal employment subsidy than with a general subsidy. In 
consequence, the increase in producer surpluses will be smaller with a 
marginal subsidy. (In the long run, the surpluses are quite eliminated in 
competitive markets and in markets of monopolistic competition.)
19 In 
the case of a marginal subsidy, price reductions by subsidised firms may 
even lead to a fall in average profits. Firms that (for some reason) do not 
qualify for the subsidy will experience a profit decline both in 
competitive markets and in non-competitive markets whether non-
subsidised firms are price followers or price makers. In economies of 
monopoly competition, non-subsidised producers of product substitutes 
may meet both a downward shift in product demand and an increase in 
the price elasticity of demand (which flattens the demand curve). Both 
changes will also reduce the profit  margins (the mark ups) of non-
subsidised firms if the price elasticity of demand is a negative function 
of output.
20  
  Hence, a general employment subsidy will in all result in higher actual 
profits than a corresponding marginal subsidy. Wage drift will therefore 
become stronger with a general subsidy if actual profits are more 
                                                 
19  I assume here as before that the product supply curves are upward sloping. An 
important assumption is also that the price elasticity of demand for price-setting 
firms is approximately the same at the different output levels of  marginal and 
general subsidies; mark ups are theoretically higher in the marginal-subsidy case if 
the price elasticity of demand is a negative function of output. 
 
20 The analysis in footnote 8 does not inform the reader that prices are a function of 
output when product competition is imperfect. I assume—in accordance with profit 
maximization behaviour—that prices are determined as a mark up over marginal 
costs as follows: P(Y) = m(Ym)W/f’(.) where W is nominal wages and m the mark-
up ratio P/MC where MC is equal to W/f’(.). The marginal product of labour f’ is a 
function of output (Y) since output varies with employment. m is also a function of 
Y since it is determined by the degree of monopoly (m) and therefore by the price 
elasticity of demand (h), which is a function of Y in the general case. 
  The possibility of mark-up pricing is not a serious threat to the Rehn-Meidner 
theory of a positive relationship between independent prices and dependent nominal 
wages. For instance, a decrease in aggregate product demand still leads to a price 
reduction with the reasonable assumption that any tendency to higher mark-ups 
because of a higher degree of monopoly (the price elasticity of demand is here a 
positive function of aggregate output) is counterbalanced efficiently by a diminishing 




important determinants than marginal profits. A theory that wage drift is 
primarily determined by actual profits thus makes it possible to avoid the 
conclusion that marginal employment subsidies are inflationary. 
 
 
2.2.  The theory of relative wage preferences 
  
The first component of Rehn’s and Meidner’s inflation theory accords 
with the theory of wage drift above. Let us focus, for simplicity, on the 
case where firms are price takers. Increases in prices or in physical 
(marginal) productivity will lead to nominal wage increases in, for 
instance, a sector exposed to foreign competition. But the appearance of 
wage drift will lead to further, centrally negotiated, wage increases. 
Relative wage preferences may cause higher equilibrium wages than the 
market-clearing ones. 
  There are two mechanisms for a positive relation between wage drift 
and central wages. First, wages are not adjusted instantly to market 
forces. Central wage increases in a specific period are, at least partially, 
determined by market forces that were not manifested as wage drift in 
the preceding period. Labour mobility to dynamic firms and sectors is 
imperfect and wage increases for employees who threaten to quit static 
firms and industries are delayed.  
  Second, a collective catch-up process in the Rehn-Meidner model can 
be explained by wage earners’ care for relative wages, not for real 
wages. Wage earners who have gained poorly (or not at all) by wage 
drift will demand similar wage increases to regain their relative income 
position. Wage earners compare themselves with wage earners in 
dissimilar occupations, either within the same firm or in other firms. 
They may also compare themselves with similar others, for instance with 
people of the same skill, either in the same or in other firms. However, in 
this case, the wage norm coincides with the wages determined by market 
forces (cf. Akerlof and Yellen, 1990, pp. 270-271). 
  The assumption that wage earners are interested in relative wages 
rather than real wages is fundamental to the General Theory, but also to 
some Keynesian literature on wage-wage spirals (see, for example, 
Tobin, 1972, and Jackson, Turner and Wilkinson, 1975). However, the 
Rehn-Meidner account of the attempts of ‘wage drifters’ and ‘collective’ 
wage earners to improve or maintain their relative wages has some 
original elements. 
  In the General Theory, wage earners will accept an increase in the 




relative-wage preferences—that all wage earners’ real wages go down 
when consumer prices go up while relative wages remain unchanged. 
The Rehn-Meidner model assumes a similar real wage-employment 
mechanism because of a relative-wage preference, but also that ‘wage 
drifters’ will get some nominal wage increases. The improvement in the 
relative pay position of the ‘wage drifters’ explains why they accept a 
possible reduction in real wages. 
  The Rehn-Meidner model assumes that nominal wage increases in the 
leading sector result in compensation claims from other wage earners 
due to relative wage preferences. Almost identical wage-wage theories 
have later been formulated in the Keynesian literature. According to 
James Tobin, higher labour demand pushes up the wages of scarce 
personnel and causes a wage-wage spiral when relative wage preferences 
prevail. Here, it is a strategic group of the already employed who set the 
wage norms for new employees (Tobin, 1972, p. 12). In the Rehn-
Meidner model, firms’ attempts to keep indispensable employees is only 
one aspect of an initial wage increase. Wage drift depends ultimately on 
expansive firms’ demand for additional labour. In the Rehn-Meidner 
model, strategic groups in the labour market are not necessarily insiders 
as in the Tobin model. In both models, however, a higher labour demand 
for scarce labour will lead to higher wages, which are spread to other 
parts of the labour market because of relative wage preferences. 
  Imitation of wage drift is the basic policy of trade unions in the Rehn-
Meidner model. But the possibilities for trade unions to satisfy a relative 
wage preference depend largely on the power position of labour. This, in 
turn, is basically determined by the labour market situation. Thus, labour 
market conditions have a twofold impact on collective wages in the 
Rehn-Meidner model. They will determine wage drift, which is the 
guideline of collective wage bargaining, and they will influence the 
power position of collective labour, which determines ability to 
accomplish wage imitation.  
  In the Rehn-Meidner model, the possibilities of wage imitation are 
also a function of the general position of the trade union movement 
irrespective of the employment situation. These possibilities are further 
determined by firms’ ability to pass on wage increases to consumers and 
by their willingness to accept that labour is rewarded in excess of 






2.3.  The theory of a wage-wage spiral 
 
The idea that wage-wage-price spirals, inflation in a true sense, will 
emerge after a macroeconomic shock is central in Rehn’s and Meidner’s 
work. Thus, wages (and prices) will not converge to a new equilibrium 
level. It is possible to shed light on the Rehn-Meidner view by giving an 
account of the 1960s Scandinavian model (the Aukrust model in Norway 
and the EFO model in Sweden). The Rehn-Meidner model allows scope 
for wage-wage and wage-price spirals, while the similar Scandinavian 
model is actually a theory of wages and prices (and profitability) in 
equilibrium. 
  In the Scandinavian model, increases in world market prices or 
productivity generate a short-term  upswing in the profit share in the 
sector exposed to foreign competition (through higher profit margins). 
This upswing will lead to higher wages in this sector since higher 
expected profits and higher self-financing capacity will imply higher 
investments and more demand for labour. Higher profits will also lead to 
higher wage claims and a weaker resistance to such claims in national 
wage negotiations (Aukrust, 1977, p. 115).  The wage increase in the 
exposed sector then results in corresponding wage increases in the 
sheltered sector by virtue of the free market mechanism, relative wage 
preferences and the solidaristic wage policy—seen here as a 
phenomenon that reinforces the collective imitation of wage drift. Wage 
increases in the sheltered sector can be passed on to the consumer 
through mark-up pricing. The average rise in prices in the whole 
economy will therefore probably be higher than in the competitive sector 
because of a lower rate of productivity growth in the sheltered sector 
(Aukrust, 1977, and Edgren, Faxén and Odhner, 1973). 
  Similarly, the rate of pay increases will self-adjust downward when 
the profit share is initially reduced. Lower profit margins make it more 
difficult for firms to self-finance and also make firms more pessimistic, 
which in turn leads to fewer investments and less demand for labour.  
  There are striking similarities between the pictures of the wage 
process in the Scandinavian and the Rehn-Meidner models. The 
resemblance becomes even stronger if the Rehn-Meidner model is 
similarly based on a division into an open and a sheltered sector. The 
open sector is dominated by wage drift (or by national wage agreements 
that directly reflect labour market conditions) and the sheltered sector by 
compensatory, centrally agreed, pay rises. In this perspective, the Rehn-




restrictive fiscal policies to prevent the emergence of high profits.
21 
  But there are also clear differences between the models. The most 
important difference is that wage-wage spirals and wage-price spirals 
occur in the Rehn-Meidner model but are prevented in the Scandinavian 
model. The assumption made in the latter is that prices in the exposed 
sector are exogenous (at a given exchange rate) and that wages in the 
sector are determined by these prices (at a given productivity 
development).
22 
  The Rehn-Meidner model never deals explicitly with the reasons why 
an economy, when its equilibrium is disturbed, changes from a condition 
of wage and price rises to a condition of continued wage rises and 
inflation. A wage-wage spiral will emerge if employees in the open 
sector wholly or partly succeed in re-establishing the wage lead they 
initially gained through wage drift. I will give two possible explanations 
for this  kind of wage development. If these theories are refuted, the 
Rehn-Meidner model must rely on the economy being exposed to 
constant disruptions that never allow wages and prices to converge to 
equilibrium. 
  A reasonable hypothesis is that mark-up pricing also takes place in the 
open sector, at least in parts of it. Thus, firms in the exposed sector will 
accept new wage increases, since they are able to pass them on to 
customers, assuming that the price elasticity of demand is constant.  
  An alternative hypothesis is that firms in the exposed sector are forced 
to accept or will even initiate wage increases that cannot be passed on. In 
the first case, ‘wage drifters’ manage to enforce further wage increases 
that maintain their distance to other groups (the labour supply curve in 
the leading sector shifts upward). In the second case, the behaviour of 
firms may reflect a lack of information about market conditions, or that 
the initial profit increase provides scope for ‘unearned’ rewards for the 
                                                 
21 In fact, the Rehn-Meidner model’s hypothesis that profitability will fall when 
domestic demand is curbed is challenged by the assumption that export is stimulated 
by an accompanying reduction in the rate of price and wage increases. The challenge 
was accepted early by Rehn (see Rehn, 1952). 
 
22 The Keynesian theory of ‘equilibrium inflation’ was inspired by the Scandinavian 
model, which in turn exhibits similarities with the Rehn-Meidner model (Jackson, 
Turner and Wilkinson, 1975). But a strategy of ‘equilibrium’ (or moderate) inflation 
was already criticised by Rehn and Meidner in the 1951 LO report.  
  Another difference between the models is that productivity is given in the 
Scandinavian model but is determined by structural changes and rationalisations in 





employees (see the X-inefficiency theory).  
  It seems, however, that the arguments above offer only a weak case 
for a sustainable wage-wage-price spiral. The process is easily 
counterbalanced by monetary restraints unless an accommodating 
economic policy is pursued. The room for mark-up pricing must also be 
limited, especially in the open sector. Besides, the firms in the open 
sector will successively require information about market conditions and 
refuse to give ‘unearned’ wages to employees when their profits fall. 
  The existence of counteracting forces in the wage-wage-price process 
does not exclude the possibility of such processes, at least for a while, in 
a country like Sweden. The Rehn-Meidner assumption of destabilising 
(unless immediately remedied) macroeconomic shocks should not be 
rejected without a careful empirical test. 
 
 
2.4.  The failure of incomes policy 
 
The Rehn-Meidner model has the advantage of integrating wage theories 
based on firms’ competition for scarce labour, labour strength and 
relative wage preferences. (I use the notion of labour strength here to 
cover trade union ability to compensate for wage drift.) Rehn’s and 
Meidner’s integrated wage theory is a dynamic one. Wage increases 
determined by favourable market conditions reproduce themselves in the 
labour market through employee interest in relative wages and through a 
strong bargaining position for wage earners covered by collective 
agreements. Credible explanations are also given for the fact that ‘cost 
crises’ often occur during recessions. The rate of pay rises eases in the 
competitive sector (or in the sector with given prices), while the 
preceding economic boom continues to have a strong influence on wage 
formation through ‘imitating’ central agreements, with subsequent 
individual claims to retain a wage advantage.  
  There are similar descriptions of cost crisis in a recession in some 
Keynesian theories. But the crucial question is why the views on 
incomes policy differ so greatly between most Keynesians and Rehn-
Meidner. Keynesians, with some exceptions (see Tobin, 1972), exhibit a 
great confidence in incomes policy. In macroeconomic textbooks that 
integrate Keynesian and neo-classical perspectives, wages are 
determined by the marginal productivity theory. Here, incomes policy is 
a  parameter of  action; price increases induced by higher aggregate 
demand can be counterbalanced efficiently by incomes policy—




Keynesian wage-push models (including ‘fair wage’ models), the extent 
and performance of incomes policy are a function of wage-earner unity 
and the degree of wage centralisation. Incomes policy is also possible in 
an economy with high demand—a strong trade union movement may 
just as well be party to an incomes policy settlement as to forcing up the 
level of wages. 
  A co-ordination of trade union policy has ambiguous effects on wages 
in the Rehn-Meidner model. It will facilitate a wage policy of fairness, 
which will mitigate wage races between trade unions. But it will also 
raise the potential of wage earners as a group to increase real wages at 
the expense of profits. Further, the potential of incomes policies is 
limited in a boom; it is tempting for trade unions to strive for 
compensation for wage drift when their bargaining position is 
strengthened. Hence, individual trade unions may resist participating in 
incomes policy agreements. In addition, any collective wage moderation 
leading to higher actual profits may increase both company ability and 
company willingness to offer higher wages to individuals and to trade 
unions not covered by incomes policy.  
  Thus, incomes policy, whether statutory or co-ordinated by central 
trade unions, will be undermined by relative wage preferences. These are 
easier to satisfy when unemployment is low and actual profits are high. 
But the fundamental reason why the potential for incomes policy is 
limited in the Rehn-Meidner model is the idea that wage increases are 
initiated by firms’ competition for labour. Central trade union 
organisation attempts to introduce wage restraint are effectively 
counteracted by free market forces and by the unions’ demand for 
compensation for wage drift.  
 
 
2.5.  The short-run theory of profits 
 
My account of the Rehn-Meidner theories of profits and the functional 
distribution of income assumes that there are two inputs only, capital and 
labour. In the short run, the capital stock is constant and neither 
substitution between capital and labour nor technological progress and 
structural changes are allowed for. 
  In the Rehn-Meidner model, the profit share is pro-cyclical. The pro-
cyclical pattern reflects that real wages—or more correctly, product 
wages—are counter-cyclical. Thus, the Rehn-Meidner model rules out 
the possibility that both profit shares and real wages are pro-cyclical, a 




pricing in which productivity is more pro-cyclical than mark ups. (Pro-
cyclical productivity may reflect pro-cyclical marginal productivity or 
labour hoarding.) There is some scope for mark-up pricing in the Rehn-
Meidner model, but Rehn and Meidner do not presume that productivity 
is exceptionally pro-cyclical in relation to mark ups. 
  Real wages and profit shares may move in the same direction if factor 
substitution is possible. Higher (lower) real wages may be met by more 
(less) capital-intensive production methods, thus counteracting the 
tendency to a decline (increase) in the profit share. But since I have 
assumed that production technologies are fixed in the short run, there is no 
chance that both profit shares and real wages are pro-cyclical in the Rehn-
Meidner model. 
  Pro-cyclical profit shares in the Rehn-Meidner model reflect that 
prices are more flexible than nominal wages. Consequently, disequi-
librium profits and losses will appear in the recovery and recession 
phases respectively of the business cycle. Higher product demand will 
lead to immediate price increases in a competitive economy or an open 
economy where prices are given (through foreign price leadership). 
Prices may also react relatively fast to increases in product demand in 
economies where they are set by individual firms. 
  Price increases due to higher product demand will result in positive 
marginal profits and higher labour demand. But a gradual increase in 
nominal wages will successively eliminate disequilibrium profits and 
possibly restore the initial levels of average profits (see next subsection). 
  Hence, wages react slower than prices to changes in demand in the 
Rehn-Meidner model. The counter-cyclical pattern of real wages is 
strengthened at the turning points of the business cycle, especially in an 
open economy. An international recession period with falling world prices 
may still be characterised by nominal wage increases reflecting earlier 
overheated conditions. Analogously, an international recovery with rising 
world prices may still be distinguished by modest nominal wage increases 
determined by low labour demand in the preceding recession.  
  The central question is why nominal wages are less flexible than 
prices in the Rehn-Meidner model. The reason is not that wage earners 
with real-wage targets are misinformed. Governed as they are by relative 
wage preferences, people accept reductions of real wages upon a rise in 
aggregate demand. 
  Unemployment is one possible reason why wages lag behind prices in 
the Rehn-Meidner model. Nominal wage increases will be delayed after a 
rise in aggregate demand since labour scarcity will not yet have appeared. 




reflect high unemployment levels in preceding periods. However, this 
explanation is more in line with the Rehn- Meidner view of a ‘free’ labour 
market than with their normative model where full employment is assured 
by selective-policy instruments. 
  Labour hoarding is another possible reason why prices are more flexible 
than nominal wages in the Rehn-Meidner model. Unused labour resources 
make it possible to increase output without having to raise nominal wages 
to recruit labour or bring about over-time work. A further possible reason 
for a slow wage adjustment to prices in the Rehn-Meidner model is that it 
takes time for the firms to look for, choose applicants, and negotiate wages. 
The Rehn-Meidner assumptions of pro-cyclical profit shares and 
counter-cyclical real wages are not original. Similar assumptions are 
made, for instance, in the  General Theory and in the post-Keynesian 
tradition. However, in the latter tradition, theories of pro-cyclical profit 
shares do not necessarily assume counter-cyclical real wages. It is often 
assumed that real wages are inflexible in the short run and that profit 
shares move pro-cyclically because of labour hoarding or scale 
advantages (Kaldor, 1955-6, Eichner and Kregel, 1975, and Erixon, 
1987, pp. 69-72). In the General Theory, counter-cyclical real wages are 
not associated with pro-cyclical profit shares. Here, lower aggregate 
demand will raise real wages because of diminishing returns to labour in 
an economy that can get stuck in a position below full employment. 
Mark ups are constant in the General Theory (reflecting a given degree 
of monopoly) and labour is paid in accordance with its marginal 
productivity. The profit share is then unaffected by changes in aggregate 
demand if the relation between marginal and  average productivity is 
constant. In the Rehn-Meidner model, counter-cyclical real wages and 
pro-cyclical profit shares are explained by the simple fact that nominal 
wages lag behind producer prices for some time (given developments in 
productivity), especially in open countries where swings in the business 
cycle are induced by changes in export prices.
23  
  Rehn and Meidner did not presuppose any absolute wage rigidity in 
their theory of short-run profits. (An exception here is Hansen and Rehn, 
1956, p. 95.) The absence of absolute wage rigidity in the Rehn-Meidner 
model may come as a surprise to some observers. Rehn and Meidner 
                                                 
23  An alternative explanation is that mark ups are more pro-cyclical than 
productivity. I have not excluded the possibility that mark ups are pro-cyclical in my 
interpretation of the Rehn-Meidner model (see the discussion of a possible negative 
relationship between (world) demand growth and the degree of (international) 
competition in footnote 28). But there is no hint of an assumption that mark ups are 




could have argued for a nominal wage rigidity downward by referring to 
the prevalence of relative wage preferences. Also, nominal wage rigidity 
downward is basic to their theory of profits in the medium and long term. 
  But Rehn and Meidner reproduced a dynamic and inflationary 
economy where short run changes in the profit share are determined by 
the pace of nominal wage  increases rather than by any change in 
nominal wage levels. Wage changes may be positive because of price 
and productivity increases or a steady state of excess labour demand due 
to repetitive positive macroeconomic shocks. Further, in the Rehn-
Meidner model the rigidity of the pace of wage increases is only 
downward and it is caused by labour market policy, not by relative wage 
preferences. Thus, the consistent pattern of pro-cyclical profit shares in a 
‘free’ labour market is not explained by absolute wage rigidity. 
 
 
2.6.  Profits in the medium and long term 
 
Rehn and Meidner wanted to force down profit shares in the medium 
term (over the entire business cycle) and also in the long term. The aim 
was to increase the importance of collective saving as a source of private 
investments at the expense of self-financing. A positive public saving 
will appear with a fiscal policy that is predominantly restrictive over the 
business cycle. Rehn and Meidner also argued that a stable reduction in 
profit shares would facilitate price stabilisation as inflation could then be 
conquered from a more favourable position. A further argument for a 
long-run decline in profit shares was to change the functional 
distribution in favour of labour. The question is how a decline in the 
profit share would be obtained in the Rehn-Meidner model. 
  I will first consider the medium term. Both prices and wages are now 
fully flexible in the absence of state interventionism, along with some 
other variables treated as given and constant in the short run—
production capacity and factor intensities. But I still assume 
technological progress and structural change through capital and 
company mobility to be impossible. For convenience, I also assume that 
all labour is variable. The number of firms is fixed in the medium term—
an assumption that precludes structural changes by exits from and entries 
to the economy under discussion. Finally, demographic shifts in labour 
supply are excluded. 
  When analysing profit shares in the medium term, the Scandinavian 
model can be used as a benchmark model. Here, the profit share in 




after an exogenous increase in prices or productivity is only temporary; 
wage drift and centrally agreed pay increases will return the profit share 
to its original value. Similarly, the profit share will recover fully after 
having been initially reduced. 
  The Scandinavian model actually contains no explanation of why 
changes in the profit share are fully offset by wage adjustments. Full 
employment reigns, which means that the profit share cannot return to its 
earlier level through changes in unemployment. The Scandinavian model 
also rules out the possibility of adjustments of labour supply through 
real-wage targets. (This mechanism is  probably prevented by an 
assumption of relative wage preferences.) Finally, any likelihood of the 
profit share returning to its initial value through changes in the exchange 
rates is likewise excluded (cf. the Bretton Woods system of fixed 
exchange rates at the time the model was developed). The model’s 
conclusion of a constant profit share in the medium term seems to be 
based on the assumption of a perfectly inelastic labour supply, i.e. a 
labour supply completely insensitive to changes in real wages. There is 
some scope for incomes policy in the Scandinavian model but the model 
is basically one of wage determination in an open economy without any 
reference to co-ordinated bargaining. 
  The Scandinavian model gives no room for a permanent shift in the 
profit share. There is no place, for instance, for a theory that the profit 
share will decrease with a transition from an economy with 
unemployment to an economy with strong political ambitions to achieve 
full employment. In the Rehn-Meidner theory of a decline  in profit 
shares on the other hand, the transition to full employment is central. 
  Rehn and Meidner recognised that a restrictive fiscal policy is an 
unreliable measure per se for reducing the profit share. Price decreases—
or better, a lower rate of price  increases—will lead to nominal wage 
adjustments because of lower labour demand. The adjustments are 
particularly strong if the bargaining position of organised labour is 
weakened by higher unemployment or if labour supply is inelastic.  
  To avoid wage adjustments, Rehn and Meidner wanted to combine a 
restrictive fiscal policy with a selective policy for full employment. 
Labour market policy would prevent wage adjustments downwards for 
two reasons. First, excess labour supply and unemployment at the initial 
wage rates because of the restrictive fiscal policy would not be 
manifested. The pace of wage increases in competitive labour markets is 
kept up by the fact that potentially unemployed people are placed in 
various labour market programmes. Second, trade unions are in a better 




It is true that nominal wage increases through labour market policies are 
counterbalanced by improvements in the flexibility of the labour market. 
But the Rehn-Meidner model assumes that the wage rate will be kept up 
during a recession by labour market policies. In bad times, therefore, the 
rigidity mechanism is stronger than the flexibility mechanism. However, 
in a boom, the flexibility aspect of labour market policy is decisive i.e., 
the wage rate will be reduced. 
  Rehn and Meidner seem to assume for the medium term that labour 
market policy will keep wages up in spite of the stimulus of labour 
mobility. A restrictive general economic policy will lead to price reductions 
but not to corresponding wage decreases when there is full employment. 
Already in the LO report, Rehn and Meidner maintained that a restrictive 
economic policy may lead to a decline in the profit share in a situation 
where full employment is sustained by labour market policy measures 
(Meidner and Rehn et al, 1953, pp. 92-94 and 99, and Rehn, 1977, p. 212). 
  There are some question marks in Rehn’s and Meidner’s explanation 
of a decline in the profit share in the medium term. Their profit theory 
for the short run was  certainly compatible with an assumption of 
competitive product markets. In fact, the Rehn-Meidner theory of wage 
drift is primarily formulated for a competitive economy, but competitive 
markets cannot be assumed in their theory for the medium term. It is true 
that both labour market policy and tight general economic policies will 
depress real wages in a competitive economy if the marginal 
productivity of labour is diminishing.
24 However, higher real wages have 
no impact on profit shares if labour is rewarded in accordance with its 
marginal productivity and the relation between marginal and average 
productivities remains the same.  
  Rehn’s and Meidner’s basic idea was that the combination of a 
restrictive general economic policy and a labour market policy to 
achieve full employment would squeeze profit margins. Price reductions 
due to a tight general economic policy would lead to lower profit 
margins (mark ups) since labour market policy prevents falling prices 
from being fully matched by wage decreases. Rehn and Meidner also 
considered a converse relationship, where nominal wage increases 
caused by labour market policy cannot completely be passed on to 
consumers due to a restrictive general economic policy.  
  The Rehn-Meidner profit theory can easily be analysed within a model 
                                                 
24 I still assume that labour market policy will lead to higher wages in the medium 
term. I also presuppose, true to the essence of the Rehn-Meidner model, that the 
output effects of a tight general economic policy will not be offset (completely) by 





of monopolistic competition. Here, demand is a negative function of 
prices inter alia because of product competition. A restrictive fiscal and 
monetary policy will generally reduce prices in accordance with the 
Rehn-Meidner theory.
25 Rehn and Meidner are also correct in claiming 
that profit margins can hardly be depressed by a restrictive fiscal policy 
alone. It is true that the degree of monopoly—defined as a Lerner index 
determined by the price elasticity of demand—may fall after a decrease 
in output. This will happen if the price elasticity of demand is a negative 
function of output. However, the fall in the degree of monopoly will be 
insignificant if demand is relatively insensitive to price changes. And 
more important, the decrease in output through a tight fiscal policy is 
counterbalanced by gradual adjustments of nominal wages. The following 
recovery of output will then coincide with a recovery of profit margins. 
  But it is not obvious why a cost-push policy established through 
labour market policy measures must be complemented with a tight 
general economic policy. There are clear limitations on the possibilities 
to mark up cost increases in models of imperfect competition when the 
price elasticity of demand is a negative function of output. A shift 
upward of the marginal cost curve will reduce mark ups, for instance in 
the case of a linear demand curve, since demand becomes more elastic at 
lower output levels.
26 The relationship probably characterises an open 
economy with some scope for independent price policies by domestic 
firms. Here, profit margins are likely to be reduced by unilateral labour 
market policy measures to achieve full employment, since foreign 
competition prevents all wage increases from being passed on to prices.  
  Hence, a restrictive general economic policy can be abandoned upon 
any attempts to reduce the profit share. Labour market policy alone will 
guarantee a profit margin decline in the medium term. On the other hand, 
profit margins can hardly be reduced by a restrictive general economic 
policy alone, as correctly emphasised by Rehn and Meidner. 
  The Rehn-Meidner theory of profit shares is almost identical to the 
profit-squeeze theories in Glyn and Sutcliffe (1972, pp. 58-64) and 
Erixon (1987, pp. 59-60).
27 They all claim that profit margins in a single 
                                                 
25 The price reduction will be modest or even non-existent if marginal cost curves are 
relatively flat and marginal revenue curves are relatively steep. The latter curvature 
excludes that mark ups are strongly counter-cyclical, for instance, through extensive 
collusion between producers in a recession. 
 
26 Mark ups are only constant at a constant price elasticity of demand, see the 
assumption for the sheltered sector in the Scandinavian model. 
  
27 The Rehn-Meidner theory of functional income distribution is also similar to 




country will be reduced by an economic policy to maintain full 
employment. The policy leads to wage increases which are impossible to 
fully mark up because of foreign competition. It will also prevent wage 
adjustments after a reduction in aggregate product demand. The main 
difference between the theories is that in Glyn and Sutcliffe (1972) and 
Erixon (1987), harder international competition, rather than a tighter 
general economic policy as in the Rehn-Meidner model, is what induces 
the decline in demand.
28  
  The structural shift from an economy with unemployment to an 
economy where full employment is always maintained by selective 
measures will depress the profit share, according to Rehn and Meidner. 
They realised, however, that their general profit-squeeze policy could be 
too effective. Private investments may be seriously hampered even if 
marginal profits emerge,  ceteris paribus, through mobility-enhancing 
labour market policy measures (or marginal employment premiums). 
Further, the Rehn-Meidner model recognises other kinds of inflation 
than demand inflation. Full employment can speed up a wage-wage 
spiral by increasing the possibilities to fulfil relative wage preferences 
and perhaps even by strengthening such preferences per se. In the end, 
the creators of the Rehn-Meidner model were open for incomes policy. 
They emphasised the possibility and desirability of having a central 
union organisation to dampen the general rate of wage increases by 
means of ‘voluntary’ incomes  policy, at least in normal phases of the 
business cycle (see, for example, Meidner and Rehn, et al, 1953, pp. 90-
91, and Rehn, 1982).  
                                                                                                                                     
structure conditions, ‘tacit’ agreements between producers, and the power of trade 
unions. Strong trade unions will push for high nominal wages that are difficult to 
mark up due to restraints from competition in commodity markets (Kalecki, 1965, 
pp. 17-18). The main difference between the theories is that nominal wages are a 
function of labour demand and supply in the Rehn-Meidner model, not exogenous as 
in the Kaleckian model. 
 
28  The difference between the theories is reduced if the Rehn-Meidner model 
assumes that international competition is intensified by a downward shift in 
aggregate product demand. A reduction of output is associated with a lower degree 
of monopoly in models in which price elasticity of demand is a negative function of 
output, and it is legitimate to equate intensity of global competition with degree of 
monopoly in an open model. According to this reading of the Rehn-Meidner model, 
fiercer global competition is induced by a reduction in aggregate demand. However, 
a harder competitive struggle on the international scene is hardly caused by a 
restrictive economic policy in a small country. One—though rather far-fetched—
interpretation of the Rehn-Meidner model is that global competition is intensified 




There is a clear ambiguity between trade union mobilisation and the 
acceptance of ‘social responsibility’ expressed both in the LO report and 
in later publications by Rehn and Meidner (cf., for example, Rehn, 1982 
p. 8 and p. 26). The ambiguity reflects a latent dilemma for a reformist 
labour movement. The LO report avoids the dilemma by declaring that 
central trade unions  have only an  indirect responsibility for average 
wage developments. Wage races between trade unions can be prevented 
by a solidaristic wage policy, including a policy for fair wage 
differentials. Furthermore, the LO report avoids the labour reformist 
dilemma by stating that the trade union movement must first force down 
the profit share and then ensure that nominal wages increase in pace with 
productivity growth. In the first stage, the arguments for income 
redistribution go hand in hand with the ambition to create favourable 
conditions for stabilisation policy. In the second stage, the labour 
movement must take social responsibility to prevent inflationary wage 
claims and further decreases in the profit share.  
  Two critical remarks can be made on a theory that profit margins (and 
profit shares) will inevitably fall in the medium and long term because of 
(selective) measures to sustain full employment.  
  First, Rehn and Meidner did not weigh the possibility that in the long 
run, a profit fall in the analysed sector is counteracted by company exits. 
They may have assumed that entry barriers would prevent company 
flight to other sectors, or other countries.
29 
  Second, Rehn and Meidner did probably not consider that the 
tendency to lower profit shares can be offset by more capital-intensive 
production methods in the medium term. They seem to take it for granted 
that the increase in real wages is decisive for profit share developments. 
This view excludes, for instance, the existence of a Cobb-Douglas 
production function. Here, changes in relative factor prices are fully 
offset by changes in quantities demanded, leaving income distribution 
between labour and capital unaltered.  
  In the long run, the change in factor prices to the advantage of labour 
may even turn to  its opposite, as industries with capital-intensive 
production methods will expand relatively fast (cf. Flam, 1987). It is also 
possible that employment policies to create labour scarcity will be 
neutralised by demographic increases in labour supply. 
                                                 
29 Entry barriers can also explain why profit margins in the sector under discussion 
are positive in the long run. Thus, in the Rehn-Meidner model, producers may be 
challenged by price and product competition, but their profits will not be eliminated 





Rehn’s and Meidner’s endogenous growth theory, whereby cost 
pressures on firms and industries stimulate productivity growth, can 
meet some of the objections above. A possible switch to capital-intensive 
techniques and industries is a desirable by-product of a full employment 
(and solidaristic wage) policy, not an annoying limitation in their model. 
The substitution of capital for labour will increase the long-run capacity 
of the economy to sustain high real wage growth by stimulating the 
development and use of labour-saving technologies (see 3.6). 
 
 
2.7.  The theory of structural change 
 
The cost pressure from solidaristic wage policy and a restrictive econ-
omic policy on marginal firms in an industry is illustrated in Figure 3. 
The firms in the industry are listed by their profit margins, i.e. the ratio 
between sales values and wage bills. I assume that there are no other 
inputs than homogenous labour and that prices are given and the same 
for all firms. I further assume, in accordance with the Rehn-Meidner 
model, that firms have different productivity levels. The number of firms 
is assumed to be constant.  
   
 
Figure 3: Solidaristic wage policy, profit margins, and the number of firms 
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The scope of the solidaristic wage policy is represented by the angle of 
the profit-margin lines in  Figure 3. Two profit-margin structures are 
presented. In the interests of simplicity I assume that the profit-margin 
structure in the industry can be described in linear terms. The flatter PM’ 
line shows profit margins in an initial state where wages are more in 
accordance with firms’ ability to pay, which is determined by their 
productivity levels. There are thus relatively weak tendencies to 
solidaristic wage policy or to uniform  wages through labour mobility 
between firms in the initial state.
30  
  The steeper PM’’ line shows profit margins at wages that follow the 
principle of equal pay for comparable work more closely. I have defined 
the level of solidaristic wages as wages paid by the medium firm (m) in 
the initial state. 
  The dotted lines in Figure 3 show the number of firms above the point 
of break-even (O) where prices are equal to unit wage costs. A smaller 
number of firms will survive at solidaristic wage policy than at wages 
that are more adjusted to productivity differences between firms 
(compare A and B in the figure). But firms with higher productivity 
levels than the medium ones have larger profit margins if the industry 
pays solidaristic wages (see the shadowed area in Figure 3). 
  Figure 3 can also be used to show that economic policy matters for 
growth in the Rehn-Meidner model. Stabilisation policy shifts the profit-
margin line upward or downward if it leads to uniform price changes in the 
industry under discussion. A downward shift in the profit-margin line will 
place more firms below the O line, the point of break-even, unless they 
increase productivity. A solidaristic wage policy may speed up 
rationalisations and closures but only together with a restrictive general 
economic policy.
31 
  The Rehn-Meidner model offers an alternative to a neo-classical, 
Marshallian, model of structural change. This is not to say that there are 
no similarities between the models. In both models, relative profitability 
is the driving force behind structural change. The description of wage 
formation in a ‘free’ labour market is also identical—higher pay in 
expanding sectors attracts labour from other sectors. But the incentives 
to mobility differ between the models. 
                                                 
30 I have not considered the extreme case of a horizontal PM line where productivity 
differences are completely matched by wage differences. If the number of firms is 
large, the profit-margin line will be identical to the 0 line in Figure 3. 
 
31 However, small ‘excess profits’ for firms with high productivity may delay 
‘internal’ structural change in the Rehn-Meidner model if investments in new 




In the neo-classical theory, a change in relative demand causes sector-
based wage differentials to emerge. This induces wage earners to change 
workplaces. Wage equalisation is a result of this process of adjustment, 
since wage earners with the same marginal productivity receive the same 
pay in the new equilibrium. 
  When a solidaristic wage policy is in effect, there can be no transfer of 
labour because of wage differences. Instead, Rehn and Meidner rely 
upon a rationing mechanism. The solidaristic wage policy increases the 
inflow of job applicants and vacancies (all else being equal) which tends 
to counterbalance the negative effects on mobility caused by weaker pay 
incentives. However, a sluggish labour market may hamper structural 
change; labour market policy measures must therefore be used to oil the 
mechanism of rationing. 
  It has often been claimed by Rehn and others that the solidaristic wage 
policy simulates perfect market equilibrium for wage earners with the 
same marginal productivity. But in contrast to the Marshallian model, a 
solidaristic wage policy limits the chances of bringing about a transfer of 
labour through the wage mechanism. Other motives are needed to create 
mobility in the labour market. 
  Rehn’s and Meidner’s preference for solidaristic wage policy is based 
on a conviction that wage differentials must grow large in order to create 
a significant labour mobility because of inertia in the labour market 
(Rehn, 1952, pp. 44-45). Large wage differentials, according to Rehn 
and Meidner, are inflationary, as well as being unacceptable from an 
equity point of view. Besides, solidaristic wage policy will not only free 
the resources and create the conditions for structural change by hastening 
company closures, it will also increase the companies’ and the capital 
market’s incentives to facilitate a transfer of resources between sectors 
by increasing differences in profitability. The differences may become so 
great that any entry barriers and other rigidities (such as sluggish capital 
markets) that prevent structural change can be overcome. Profit differentials 
will increase, not only through solidaristic wage policy but also through labour 
market policy to facilitate dynamic firms’ recruitment of labour.  
  Thus, the Rehn-Meidner model exchanges large wage differentials, 
and high general profits, for large profit differentials (between plants, 
firms and industries) as an incentive to economic growth. In addition, the 
possible growth-dampening effects of low gross profits are counteracted 
by the access to public capital funds at low interest rates. A tacit 
assumption in the model is also that profit squeezes through high 
company taxes are counterbalanced by a monetary policy of permanently 







3.  The Validity of the Rehn-Meidner Model 
 
Foreign economists appreciate Swedish labour market policies for 
having prevented large cyclical swings and protracted spells of 
unemployment up until the 1990s (Blanchflower, Jackman and Saint-
Paul, 1995). Other foreign economists have shown a positive attitude to 
the solidaristic wage policy. Lawrence Summers claims that small inter-
firm differences in wages of equally skilled labour, for institutional or 
other reasons, will lead to low transitional unemployment; workers who 
lose attractive high-wage jobs are less reluctant to accept other jobs if 
pay differentials are relatively small (Summers, 1986, pp. 370-380).
32  
  British economists referred to Rehn in the 1980s and the early 1990s 
when recommending marginal employment subsidies to counter 
unemployment (Layard, Nickell and Jackman, 1991, pp. 490-492). 
Swedish scholars agree with Rehn that marginal subsidies are less 
inflationary than other measures and that they should be large, 
permanent and general, that is, not payable only in particular regions and 
sectors or to specific groups (Johansson, Lundborg and Zetterberg, 
1999). 
  Vital parts of the Swedish growth, inflation and wage models have 
been confirmed by theoretical developments in recent decades. The 
Rehn-Meidner hypothesis of a negative relationship between profit 
margins and productivity is basic in the literature on X-inefficiencies. 
The development of a general theory of transformation pressure in 
Sweden in the 1990s was clearly inspired by the theory of X-
inefficiency, but also by the Rehn-Meidner model (Erixon, 1991 and 
1998). 
  Further, Rehn and Meidner can be looked upon as pioneering 
opponents of Keynesian fine-tuning. They had despaired of the 
possibilities of controlling inflation and maintaining high employment 
levels under an expansive general economic policy. Macro economists 
today, especially those in the classical tradition, consider supply-side and 
                                                 
32 A similar theory was suggested in Erixon (1985) to explain why the contraction of 
high-wage industries in the crises of the 1970s and the early 1980s (mainly mining, 
steel and shipbuilding) led to lesser unemployment in Sweden than in other OECD 
countries. The compressed wage differences in Sweden due to solidaristic wage 
policy made it easier for wage earners to accept employment in other industries 





matching measures such as labour market policies the only reliable 
means of reducing unemployment in the long run (see the notion of a 
natural rate of unemployment). The Rehn-Meidner model certainly 
assumes a trade-off between unemployment and inflation, but its unique 
policy recommendations are not really punched out by the breakdown of 
the Phillips curve.  
  The modern theory of ‘fair wages’ stresses that relative wage 
preferences are important for nominal wage rigidities downward and for 
the appearance of wage-wage spirals. Egalitarian wage policy is also 
often seen as an instrument to internalise (reciprocal) negative 
externalities from relative wage preferences (see e.g. Solow, 1980, 
Summers, 1988, Agell and Lommerud, 1992, and Agell, 1999).
33 Some 
modern theories even assume that wage earners care for a fair 
distribution between capital and labour (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990). The 
similarities between the theory of fair wages and the Rehn-Meidner 
model are striking, although the model was not directly concerned with 
the question of absolute wage rigidity and its solidaristic wage policy is 
not a recommendation of equal wages for unequal work. 
  Yet, the status of the Swedish model in modern economics is 
ambiguous. Swedish labour-market policy programmes were criticised by 
both foreign and Swedish economists for being insufficient and 
ineffective when aggregate-demand conditions became exceptionally poor 
in the 1990s (see, for instance, Forslund and Krueger, 1997). It can be 
argued that the founders of the model were not against other active 
measures than labour market policy in a situation with high 
unemployment and that the criticism struck at the application rather than 
the principles of the Swedish model. But the recommendations in the mid-
1990s that the scope and purpose of labour market policy should be 
limited to helping the long-term unemployed to get regular jobs (cf. 
Blanchflower, Jackman and Saint-Paul, 1995) are definitely out of line 
with the Swedish model. 
  A growing scepticism towards solidaristic wage policy could be 
discerned among economists in the 1980s and the 1990s. The policy was 
accused of having weakened wage incentives to education and increased 
unemployment among youth and low-skilled labour. However, Swedish 
scholars were aware of the distinction between a policy of wage equality 
in general and a policy of wage solidarity as in the Swedish model (cf. 
Flam, 1987, and Hibbs and Locking, 1995).  
                                                 
33 Swedish economists have also defended an egalitarian wage policy by referring to 
its social insurance aspects and its positive effects as an incentive for low-skilled 




In most macroeconomic models, wage earners still care for real, not 
relative, wages (or functional income distribution) as in the Swedish 
model. The emphasis on real wage flexibility to engender 
macroeconomic balance in both new-Keynesian and (neo-)classical 
theories has no counterpart in the model. Here, Rehn and Meidner made 
no theoretical contribution. But their view is compatible with post-
Keynesian and ’orthodox’ Keynesian ideas of greater wage flexibility as 
an ineffective or even a self-destructive means of achieving macroeconomic 
balance (Rotheim, 1998, Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1993, and Tobin, 1993). In 
fact, Rehn and Meidner exclude the possibility of underbidding in labour 
markets by their recommendation of a selective policy for full employment.
34 
The Rehn-Meidner model of a profit-margin squeeze in the medium term 
can easily be integrated into the new-Keynesian theory of mark-up 
pricing (Romer, 1996, pp. 221-222).
35 Further, profit shares are 
substantially pro-cyclical in a country like Sweden, as assumed in the 
model (Erixon, 1987, pp. 45-49 and 72). But its assumption that real 
wages move counter-cyclically is not supported by all empirical studies, 
not even of Sweden (cf. Sumner and Silver, 1989, and Mocan and 
Topyan, 1993 with Schor, 1985, Solon, Barsky and Parker, 1994, Romer, 
1996, p. 216, and Erixon, 1987, pp. 104-106, 199 and 248).
36  
  The main challenges to the Swedish model can be found in the 
modern wage literature. Bargaining, trade union and efficiency-wage 
theories are quite distinct from those underpinning the model. In fact, 
                                                 
34  The Mundell-Fleming model of perfect capital mobility and floating exchange 
rates (which is a good approximation of Sweden since autumn 1992) supports the 
Rehn-Meidner critique of an expansive fiscal policy for being ineffective. But the 
Mundell-Fleming model also limits the validity of the Rehn-Meidner theory that 
inflation is dampened by a restrictive fiscal policy. 
 
35  Actual changes in profitability and profit shares cannot easily be explained in 
terms of the Swedish model; its theory of the medium and long term gives room for 
different interpretations and there are difficulties in distinguishing between 
permanent and temporary influences on profits in practice. It might be possible to 
claim, however, that the decline in profit shares in Sweden in the 1960s and 1970s, 
and the strong recovery in the 1990s, was expected from a model in which full 
employment is a necessary condition for a profit squeeze (cf. Erixon, 1995, p. 51). 
 
36 Pro-cyclical profit shares are compatible with pro-cyclical real wages if 
productivity is more pro-cyclical than mark ups. Pro-cyclical mark ups are not 
excluded by my interpretation of the Rehn-Meidner model (see footnotes 23 and 28), 
but the existence of pro-cyclical marks ups  has been questioned on empirical 
grounds, at least for major OECD countries (Romer, 1996, p. 219, Galeotti and 
Schiantarelli, 1998, and Martins and Scarpetta, 1999. See, however, Haskel, Martin 




Rehn and Meidner (and Bent Hansen) saw their wage model of 
competitive markets as an alternative to bargaining and game theories of 
the time. Analogously, modern bargaining theories are seen as 
challenges to wage models in which market forces occupy a central 
position (Blanchflower, Oswald and Sanfey, 1996, pp. 227-228). 
Bargaining and trade union theories are easier to reconcile with the post-
Keynesian and new-Keynesian approaches than with the Rehn-Meidner 
model.  
  I will make some brief comments in this section on the relation between the 
Rehn-Meidner, trade-union, bargaining and efficiency-wage models. Their 
different views of profits are analysed in detail in subsection 3.1.1. 
  Relative wage preferences matter in both trade union and bargaining 
models. Further, co-ordinated negotiations will, ceteris paribus, lead to 
wage restraint when relative wage preferences prevail, both in these 
models and in the Swedish model. But their explanations differ. Most 
trade union theorists stress that negative wage externalities can be 
internalised by co-ordination per se. (See also the theories of fair wages 
above.) In the Rehn-Meidner model, a similar internalisation will occur, 
but the importance of wage co-ordination is indirect only—it is now 
possible to establish and realise a consensus on fair wages.  
  In some bargaining theories, relative wage preferences go hand in 
hand with wage restraint at the central level since a unified trade union 
movement (or key groups in the labour market) consider that their wage 
claims will influence other wages and therefore consumer prices. High 
central pay awards cause substantial wage drift and thus large price 
increases for consumers (Moene, Wallerstein and Hoel, 1993, pp. 76-80, 
and Calmfors, 1993b, pp. 15-16). A similar mechanism is excluded in 
the Rehn-Meidner model, in which wage drift is a prime driving force, 
inter alia through guiding central agreements, and central wage restraint 
makes room for further wage drift. In addition, the assumption that wage 
earners are concerned about relative wages (and functional income 
distribution) given the productivity development is fundamental to the 
Rehn-Meidner model. Thus, the (expectations of) real wages (after tax) 
has no impact on central wage claims in the model.   
  A common conclusion in both the Rehn-Meidner and the trade union 
models is that co-ordinated wage bargaining will not necessarily lead to 
wage restraint. In trade union models, the larger possibilities of 
internalising relative-wage preferences can be counterbalanced by the 
mitigation of wage competition between workers who are substitutes in 
production (Calmfors and Forslund, 1990, and Uddén-Jondal, 1993). A 




model when trade unions co-operate. But where modern trade union 
theorists emphasise that positive externalities can be internalised when 
wage claims are co-ordinated, the model assumes (like bargaining 
models) that unity makes the labour movement stronger. 
  The efficiency wage theory and the Rehn-Meidner model share the 
idea that wage increases are initiated by employers. Another common 
characteristic, taking the X-inefficiency version of the Rehn-Meidner 
model into account, is that wages may rise above the competitive 
equilibrium level (see Yellen, 1984). Yet the differences between the 
theories are evident. There is no analogy in the Rehn-Meidner model to 
the efficiency wage hypothesis that higher wages will spur employee 
efforts and improve the average quality of job applicants (adverse 
selection). In the X-inefficiency version of the Rehn-Meidner model 
higher wages are consequences of an inefficient behaviour on the part of 
employers; they are not a stimulus to more efficient performance. 
  Comparisons between the efficiency-wage theory and the Swedish 
model are complicated by the fact that the former theory is sometimes 
integrated with the theory of fair wages. Thus, some efficiency-wage 
models are based on relative-wage rather than real-wage targets 
(Summers, 1988, Akerlof and Yellen, 1990, and Agell, 1999). The 
integration is not always obvious.  The Swedish model illustrates that 
relative wage preferences can be analysed without taking notice of a 
positive relationship between wages—relative or real—and efforts. This 
is one of the reasons why the model’s view of wage equality is different. 
In the fair wage-effort theory, a compression of wages for skilled and 
unskilled labour may coincide with the interests of individual firms (with 
profit maximization) as employee efforts depend on the wage received 
by other employees in the same firm (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990, pp. 272-
276). In the Swedish model, similar wage compression is not advocated 
by profit-maximizing firms and not even by co-operating trade unions 
unless existing wage structures are perceived as too distorted by customs 
or short-run market conditions. In fact, attempts to realise a relative wage 
preference are a threat to a fair wage policy in the Swedish model.  
  In the following, I will relate some of the propositions in the Rehn-
Meidner model to predominant views in modern economics. To 
substantiate this examination, I will also relate them to the results of 
empirical studies that have been carried out, particularly in the 1980s and 
1990s (not all of which, however, refer directly to the Rehn-Meidner 
model). My focus is on studies of Sweden, where the empirical literature 
is voluminous. The aim is to illustrate whether or not the Rehn-Meidner 




taken too literally, however. At most they can give a rough indication of 
the relevance of the model. 
  It is beyond the scope of this work to relate all of the model’s 
propositions to modern economics. At the risk of presenting an 
incomplete picture, I have opted to limit my presentation to a small 
number of central hypotheses that are regarded as controversial in the 
modern economic literature. The choice of propositions is also governed 
by my own professional interests.  
  My evaluation of the Rehn-Meidner model is thus based on six 
propositions concerning the functioning of labour and product markets 
and the outcomes of economic and wage policies. Three of these (nos. 3, 
5 and 6) although often associated with the Swedish model have a 
dubious place in it. They have therefore been modified to give a more 
representative picture of the model. 
 
 
3.1.  The relationship between profits and wages 
 
Proposition 1: Actual profits or profit margins are strategic variables in 
wage formation as they are both indicators of the expected profitability 
of recruiting labour and basic determinants per se of companies’ ability 
and willingness to offer higher wages. 
 
Proposition 1 expresses the central position of profits in the Rehn-
Meidner model. Wage drift is boosted by high expected profits and by 
high actual profits. Actual profits are not in fact determinants of 
expected profits in the model. Instead, they are in themselves central 
driving forces behind wage drift as well as approximations of the 
expected profits from hiring labour. 
  The hypothesis of a positive relationship between profits and wages is 
basically formulated for a competitive labour market in the Rehn-
Meidner model. Higher prices and marginal productivities lead to 
positive marginal profits at the initial wage rate which in turn will 
stimulate labour demand. This marginal productivity theory can be 
extended to take account of the degree of monopoly in product markets 
and also of a possible positive relationship between average profits and 
firms’ competition for labour (see subsection 2.1). Wages (and 
employment) are then determined at the intersection of labour demand 
and labour supply. 
  The use of the notion ‘competitive’ to characterise the Rehn-Meidner 




and departures from profit maximisation in the model. Wages can be 
higher than the market-clearing ones due to relative wage preferences, 
labour market policy and X-inefficiencies. In the latter case, companies 
may initiate wage increases that are not induced by higher labour 
demand. Employees will be rewarded in excess of their (marginal) value 
productivity when profits are high. Further, central agreements and the 
balance of power between organised labour and employers are important 
wage determinants in the Rehn-Meidner model (regardless of being 
conditional for solidaristic wage policy).  
  But these phenomena do not challenge the fundamental competitive 
nature of the Rehn-Meidner wage model. Relative wage preferences are 
primarily of interest in the phase where (competitive) wage drift is 
imitated by collective wage increases. Hence, central wage negotiations 
are elements in a catch-up process rather than driving forces per se in the 
Rehn-Meidner model (see 3.2 below). In fact, trade-union strength 
primarily determines the possibilities for ‘collective’ wage earners to get 
the same wage increases as wage earners in competitive labour markets. 
Labour market policy is a policy parameter, not a fundamental part of the 
Rehn-Meidner wage model. The policy will be applied in a recession 
when labour demand, by some reason, falls short of labour supply. The 
policy will be practised in a recovery as well but here, the wage-setting 
aspects are not decisive according to the model (see 2.6). 
  The X-inefficiency theory is, in spite of all, not a basic element of the 
Rehn-Meidner model. In the first place, profits are arguments in a labour-
demand function whether the effects of marginal or average profits are 
emphasised. However, I have attributed to the model an assumption that 
relative wage preferences are easier to satisfy if firms are X-inefficient. 
  Wages can be influenced by solidaristic wage policy in the Rehn-
Meidner model. In fact, proposition 1 is even rejected in the case of 
solidaristic wage policy. But the model assumes that market forces are 
powerful even in economies with central wage negotiations. The 
incentives for dynamic industries or firms to offer higher wages are not 
weakened by solidaristic wage policy. The policy will even raise their 
financial ability to pay higher wages (see subsection 1.2). Besides, 
market rigidities can explain a short-run relation between labour demand 
and wages in countries with wage solidarity. 
 
3.1.1.  Profits in the Rehn-Meidner and in other wage theories 
 
In bargaining theories, competitive labour markets are mostly ignored or 




778). The focus is on trade unions or on wage earners with an insider 
status in labour markets. Wages in the firms are often determined in a so-
called Nash equilibrium by profits, outside income opportunities and by 
the bargaining power of labour in institutional or social terms.
37 Outside 
income opportunities is determined in turn by the rate of unemployment, 
the going wage in other sectors of the economy and by unemployment 
benefits; labour market policy is added or substituted for unemployment 
benefits in some bargaining models. Outside wages are often omitted 
since they are identical to wages in individual firms in a state of general 
equilibrium (Mac Donald and Suen, 1992, Christofides and Oswald, 
1992, Lindbeck, 1993, and Blanchflower, Oswald and Sanfey, 1996). 
  The wage determination in the bargaining theory is shown in Figure 4. 
W is the nominal wage rate and L the employment level. D is labour 
demand of identical firms determined positively by (marginal) value 
productivity and negatively by the degree of monopoly. (The demand 
curve slopes downward since a decreasing physical marginal produc-
tivity is not supposed to be fully counterbalanced by counter-cyclical 
mark ups.) L
S is labour supply which is assumed to be given (completely 
inelastic). W(L) is the wage-setting curve. Wages is assumed to be a 
positive function of employment when labour supply is given, thus a 
negative function of the rate of unemployment. Wage claims will be 
raised if unemployment benefits or profits become higher.  
  If firms alone make decisions on employment, L is determined by the 
labour demand curve given the bargaining wage rate. In equilibrium, 
nominal wages and employment are equal to W* and L* respectively 
and the rate of unemployment is equal to u*. 
  The main difference between bargaining models and the Rehn-
Meidner model concerns their views of profits in wage formation. Wages 
can be stimulated by marginal profits in both models (see the labour-
demand function in Figure 4). Further, in bargaining models, exactly as 
in the Rehn-Meidner model, high average profits result in high wages. 
But in bargaining models, a positive relationship between average profits 
(actual or expected) and wages reflects some form of rent-sharing.
38 
                                                 
37 In a Nash equilibrium, the choices of all actors are optimal given the choice of 
other actors. 
In one bargaining model a positive relationship between profits and wages is 
explained by the fact that the position of trade unions is strengthened (weakened) by 
high (low) profits (see Christofides and Oswald, 1992, p. 988). 
 
38  In some versions of the bargaining theory the relation emerges through the 
prevalence of risk-sharing. Profits and wages are positively correlated since both 




Higher average profits lead to a shift upward in the wage-setting function. 
  In the Rehn-Meidner model, firms are the only active agents behind a 
relationship between average profits and wages. High profits result in 
frivolous wage offers but also in greater possibilities of self-financing 
investments and of preventing indispensable labour from being attracted 
away by higher wage offers from expanding firms. These phenomena are 
not represented by a shift upward in the wage-setting curve. A stable 
relationship between profits and wages is possible in the Rehn-Meidner 
model, see the X-inefficiency mechanism. However, wage increases are 
initiated here by companies, they are not the result of a contractual 
arrangement between employers and employees. Hence, the bargaining 
theory does not satisfy the second part of proposition 1. 
  George Akerlof and Janet Yellen assume in their efficiency wage 
theory that wages are permanently higher in firms with higher profits. 
But the explanation differs from those in the Rehn-Meidner and 
bargaining models. According to Akerlof and Yellen, higher profits 
accruing to the firms’ owners will provoke higher wage claims. These 
claims can also be satisfied, as employers are afraid that workers 
otherwise will punish them by putting in less effort (Akerlof and Yellen, 
1990, pp. 268-269). 
 
 
Figure 4: Wage determination in a bargaining model 
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The efficiency wage theory above is incompatible with the Rehn-
Meidner model as the theory assumes that higher profits will result in 
higher wage claims—firms are the only actors behind a relationship 
between independent profits and dependent wages according to 
proposition 1. The difficulty is of course in discriminating between the 
efficiency wage, bargaining and Rehn-Meidner theories when such a 
relationship has been discovered.
39 
  But the positive relation between profits and wages is not a one-way 
causality in the efficiency wage theory—higher wages will also result in 
higher (expected) profits as long as the (expected) positive productivity 
effects are larger than the negative cost effects. In the Rehn-Meidner 
model on the other hand, higher wages due to higher labour demand will 
eliminate positive marginal profits and reduce average profitability, 
possibly to its initial rate. 
  The interrelationships between profits and wages can in principle be 
settled by a time series analysis. An observation that profits (and 
labour’s productivity) are stimulated by high wages might be seen as 
support for the efficiency wage theory at the expense of the Rehn-
Meidner model (and the rent-sharing theory). 
  But a positive relationship  between independent wages (real or 
relative) and dependent profitability may reflect other mechanisms than 
the one in the efficiency wage theory. For instance, high real wages may 
speed up the introduction of labour-saving techniques. This possibility is 
emphasised in the long-run version of the Rehn-Meidner model. 
Moreover, an observation that long-run profits are stimulated by high 
wages may confirm the theory  of ‘transformation pressure’, a crucial 
element of the Rehn-Meidner model. Higher nominal wages will certainly 
lead to a profit decline in the short run. But the decline may increase 
firms’ incentives (and also capabilities) to raise total factor productivity 
and profits in the long run (see proposition 6 below). 
 
3.1.2.  Aggregate time series analysis of Swedish wage formation 
 
The role of profits has been focused upon in many wage studies of 
Sweden in the post-war period. Most studies of wage drift or total wage 
increases up to the 1990s were based on aggregate time series data. The 
theoretical framework was eclectic or defined by the bargaining theory, 
                                                 
39 A complicating circumstance is that in some of their work Rehn and Meidner 
support a theory that high profits and dividends will induce wage claims on equity 





the closely related trade union theory, the marginal productivity theory, 
or the theory of real-wage targets (legitimising the inclusion of price or 
income-tax variables in the wage function). 
   These studies, including Rehn’s in co-operation with Bent Hansen, 
have generally emphasised the importance of labour market conditions 
and diluted the importance of profits and profit margins or (value) 
productivity in the short run (see for instance Schager, 1981, pp. 396-
402, Öhman, 1982, pp. 52-54, Bosworth and Lawrence, 1987, pp. 22-54, 
and Flanagan, 1990, p. 408). The relation between profits and wage 
increases is not even significant in all studies. In some comparative 
studies of wage developments in the OECD countries (including 
Sweden) from the early 1960s to the late 1980s, profit variables were 
simply ignored (Johnson and Layard, 1986, pp. 980-985, and Poret, 
1990).  
  However, the Rehn-Meidner model is not really challenged by 
empirical studies showing that labour market conditions, not profits, are 
decisive for wage development. Proposition 1 says that the profit 
situation may indicate the current state of labour demand (given the level 
of wage claims). In this perspective, it would be legitimate to simply 
measure labour demand by a profit variable. In a study of wage drift in 
Swedish manufacturing between 1964 and 1986, Nils Henrik Schager 
measured labour shortage as a product of the profit margin and the 
number of residual vacancies, where the actual profit margin 
approximated the additional return of taking on a new employee. The 
resulting variable explains almost all the wage drift in Swedish 
manufacturing (Schager, 1988a, and 1988b).
40 
  Schager did not clarify whether actual profit margins are in themselves 
determinants of labour demand (and therefore of wage drift) rather than 
proxies of the return on hiring more labour. But a possible conclusion that 
actual profits are strategic determinants of wage drift in Swedish 
manufacturing is not critical for  the Rehn-Meidner model. Wages are a 
positive function of actual profits or profit margins per se according to the 
second part of proposition 1. In fact, the credibility of the Swedish policy 
model will increase if actual profits are decisive for wage drift (cf. 2.1).  
                                                 
40 Schager’s study is similar to (Hansen and Rehn, 1956) by its inclusion of both 
profit margins and labour-market indicators in the wage-drift function. In my 
interpretation of the Rehn-Meidner model, profit margins represent the total marginal 
profits from hiring more labour. In this perspective, the explanations of wage drift in 
terms of profit margins and residual vacancies overlap—marginal profits reflect 
labour demand while the number of residual vacant jobs is a function of both demand 
and supply conditions. 




The poor explanatory power of profits in most aggregate wage studies of 
Sweden is not a strong argument against a theory that actual profits 
matter. High actual profits may lead to high nominal wage increases by 
stimulating labour demand. The relationship is probably underestimated in 
studies where wages are seen as determined by labour market conditions. 
The statistical difficulties of discriminating between the theories that wage 
increases are caused by expected and actual profits are monumental. 
  In any case, the proposition that profits are important for wages in 
countries like Sweden has not yet been rejected convincingly by 
aggregate time series studies. In fact, the emphasis on labour market 
conditions in many studies supports the Rehn-Meidner theory rather than 
its rivals in the modern wage literature. But it is too early to declare the 
survival of the Rehn-Meidner wage model. The model’s view of the 
wage formation process has been questioned not only on theoretical but 
also on empirical grounds in the 1990s. 
 
3.1.3.  Wage differentials between industries 
 
The relationship between profits and wages has predominantly been 
analysed in the 1990s using trade union and  bargaining models, and 
empiri-cal conclusions have mostly been based on industry comparisons 
rather than on aggregate time series analysis.  
  Numerous regression studies of wage differentials between firms and 
industries have addressed the question of whether or not labour markets 
are competitive. Most empirical work from the post-war period reject the 
hypothesis of competitive labour markets. They often refer to a positive 
correlation or a direct causality between employers’ ability to pay (firm 
performance) and wages. The empirical findings in the 1990s have 
primarily been seen as a confirmation of the rent-sharing hypothesis (see 
for instance Cristofides and Oswald, 1992, and Blanchflower, Oswald 
and Sanfey, 1996). Employers’ ability to pay is commonly indicated by 
average value productivity, the rate of return on equity or the ratio of 
profits to employment in selected industries. Most studies make 
adjustments for personal and industrial characteristics. For instance, 
wage differentials between firms and industries are compatible with 
competitive labour markets if labour is heterogeneous. 
  However, the existence of a positive correlation between profitability and 
wages is not a strong argument against a competitive labour market model. 
On the contrary, profits play the main role in wage formation according to 
proposition 1. A  long-run correlation is what might shed doubts on a 




and Zetterberg, 1991, p. 1011).
  41 Wage gaps between firms and sectors 
because of differences in profitability are eliminated by labour mobility in 
competitive labour markets. 
  For U.S. manufacturing in 1964-1985, Blanchflower et al discovered a 
strong positive (delayed) relationship in steady state between profit-per-
employee in industries (on the two-digit level) and wages. The study 
covered both unionised and non-unionised industries (Blanchflower et al, 
1996, pp. 230-238). The long-run relationship between profits and wages 
in U.S. manufacturing was distinguished by the inclusion of a lagged 
dependent variable and also of a set of current and lagged employment 
variables (see also Holmlund and Zetterberg, 1991, pp. 1020-1026). 
Blanchflower  et al  draw the conclusion that the persistent relationship 
between profits and wages is hardly compatible with a competitive model. 
  Hence, rent-sharing models seem to have won the day over competitive 
wage models, at least in the United States. But the empirical results may 
reflect the difficulties of adjusting wage differentials for personal and 
industrial characteristics, profit shocks, and slow adaptation processes in 
labour markets. Further, a stable relationship between profits and wages 
may reflect other mechanisms than rent sharing, for example that high 
profits result in easy-going wage offers as in the Rehn-Meidner model. 
  Both the Rehn-Meidner model and the bargaining model expect a 
positive relationship between profits and wages even if their 
explanations differ and the Rehn-Meidner model leaves small room for a 
stable relation (see the X-inefficiency theory). Both models also expect 
profits to  have a weak impact on wages in countries with centrally 
determined wage norms such as solidaristic wage policy. 
  Bertil Holmlund and Johnny Zetterberg have analysed wage 
differences among 28 manufacturing industries in Sweden, Norway, 
Finland, Germany and the United States from the early 1960s to the mid-
1980s. In Sweden, real labour productivity and (relative) prices had a 
significantly positive effect on industrial real wages (after tax). However, 
the long-run effect was weak (and even insignificant where prices are 
                                                 
41 Another objection in Blanchflower et al (1996) to earlier studies concerns their 
focus on unionised sectors; it is hardly illuminating to show that non-market forces 
determine wages in organised sectors. The objection is not obvious—wage drift may 
be important even in unionised sectors and even with centralised bargaining. A more 
serious criticism of the wage studies above can be formulated. A positive correlation 
between profits and  wages in unionised sectors may not confirm the rent-sharing 
theory, but may reflect, as in the Rehn-Meidner model, that high profits lead to high 
wage drift, which in turn induces collective wage increases. Further, high profits may 
increase collective wage imitation per se as they make it easier to satisfy a relative-




concerned), particularly compared with the United States (Holmlund and 
Zetterberg, 1991). An analogous study of Sweden in the 1984-1988 
period by Anders Forslund showed similar results. In fact, Forslund had 
difficulties in distinguishing any significant relation at all between 
nominal productivity and (real) wages (Forslund, 1994a. See also 
Forslund, 1994b, which unveils a significant, although weak, relation 
between nominal productivity and wages in the Swedish business 
sector).
42  
  Holmlund and Zetterberg draw the conclusion that wage policies in 
countries with centralised bargaining have been effective—“Centrali-
zation in the Nordic countries does not seem to be just an institutional 
façade” (Holmlund and Zetterberg, 1991, p. 1028). The Holmlund-
Zetterberg and Forslund studies confirm the assumption in the Rehn-
Meidner model that solidaristic wage policy will reinforce or reproduce the 
tendency towards a weak relation between profits and wages in competitive 
labour markets. The role of central bargaining and wage policies for the 
sharp reduction in wage spread in Sweden in the 1960s and the 1970s is 
stressed in empirical research. Smaller wage differentials manifested not 
only the principle of equal pay for equal work in different industries and 
plants as in the Rehn-Meidner model, but also a policy of wage equalisation 
in general (Johansson and Siven, 1984, Erixon, 1984, Pissarides and 
Moghadam, 1990, Hibbs and Locking, 1991, Nilsson, 1993, Arai, 1994, 
Hibbs and Locking, 1995, and Edin and Topel, 1997). 
  Holmlund’s updated and extended version of the Holmlund-Zetterberg 
study confirms the picture of a weak relationship between firm 
performance and wages in Sweden. However, the relation has been 
strengthened somewhat since 1983, when wage bargaining in Sweden 
became more decentralised. Besides, profit margins had a positive and 
sizeable effect on wages for white-collar workers in 1993 and 1994 
according to Holmlund’s study of 90 industries in mining and 
manufacturing (Holmlund, 1997). 
  The assertion that central norms have been decisive for the wage 
structure in Sweden may seem inconsistent with a model that pronounces 
competitive forces decisive. But labour mobility is conditional for 
solidaristic wage policy in the Rehn-Meidner model. Labour market 
flexibility was relatively high in Sweden in the years of solidaristic wage 
policy, even if the importance of labour market policy should not be 
                                                 
42 The Swedish National Industrial Board (SIND) has shown that there was no 
correlation between wages and firms’ average value productivity or profitability in 
the Swedish business sector from the late 1960s to the early 1980s (see Faxén, 
Odhner and Spånt, 1988, pp. 50-51 and 216-218). 




exaggerated (Edin and Topel, 1997, pp. 164-167). Further, Swedish 
wage policy may have been backed up by specific labour-supply 
conditions. Wage increases in dynamic firms and industries in Sweden in 
the 1960s and the 1970s were moderated by extensive immigration and 
higher female work participation. No systematic empirical work has yet 
been done on the importance of labour market policies and labour supply 
conditions for the compressed wage structure in Sweden. 
  The observations, in spite of all, of a short-run relationship between 
the ability to pay and wages in Sweden (see the Holmberg-Zetterberg 
study in particular) seem to reject the Rehn-Meidner model, where 
profit-induced wage differentials are prevented by solidaristic wage 
policy. But the model emphasises the importance of market forces even 
in countries with central wage bargaining, particularly in the short run.  
  There is a risk that the importance of profit and (value) productivity 
variables, and therefore of competitive (and risk-sharing) models, has 
been underestimated in the Swedish studies above. The role of profits may 
be underestimated in studies that ignore wage bargaining at local levels. 
A study of hourly wage differences in the Swedish private business sector 
by Mahmood Arai, based on a unique set of firm data and panel data for 
workers, shows a long-run positive relationship between profits (in 
relation to employment) and hourly wages around 1990. The relation was 
stronger than in Holmlund’s study, although weaker than shown by 
analogous studies of the United States. Arai’s study indicates that 
approximately 80 per cent of the rents appeared within industries, also that 
the profit-wage relation is not restricted to white-collar workers (Arai, 
1999).  
  The Rehn-Meidner model seems seriously hurt by Arai’s study, since 
the role of both competitive forces and solidaristic wage policy is toned 
down. But his empirical results are compatible with Holmlund’s 
conclusion that the importance of central wage norms has been 
weakened in Sweden. Further, Arai's study does not convincingly 
exclude the possibility that wage differentials between firms reflect 
transitory rather than permanent profit differentials.
43 Neither does the 
study (and the similar foreign studies) automatically confirm the rent-
sharing theory rather than other theories of a long-run relationship 
                                                 
43 The study is based on estimations of average annual profits 1987-1991. The period 
was one of extreme overheating in some Swedish industries, thus profit differentials 
hardly reflect any long-run relations. Arai made an adjustment for short-run frictions 
by the account of changes in employment in the firms (Arai, 1999, pp. 14-15, see 
also Blanchflower et al, 1996). The relationship between profits and wages was not 
altered at all by the adjustment. However, employment is a crude indicator of labour 




between profits and wages. 
  In the following  I will summarise the empirical studies of wage 
differentials between industries and firms and their relation to the Rehn-
Meidner model. The empirical results are ambiguous but so is the Rehn-
Meidner model. The model emphasises the effects of firm performance 
but also of ‘policy interventions’ such as solidaristic wage policy and of 
deviations from profit maximization in the form of X-inefficiencies.  
  The Rehn-Meidner model is confirmed by the fact that central norms 
seem to have been important for wage differentials in Sweden in the 
post-war period. Further, from the angle of the Rehn-Meidner model it 
was expected that profits would have a stronger influence on wage 
differences from the mid-1980s when the bargaining process became 
more decentralised. The Rehn-Meidner model is also verified by the 
observation of a short-run relationship between profitability and wages 
in Sweden and in other countries, as market-driving forces are 
fundamental to the model. But indications of a long-run relationship, 
even in Sweden, restrict the validity of the model, which at bottom is a 
competitive model or a model of solidaristic wages. A possible defence 
of the Swedish model is that wage offers can be X-inefficient. A stable 
relationship between profitability and wages does not necessarily mean 
support for the rent-sharing theory. 
  Research has not yet succeeded in giving a full explanation of the 
convergence of wages in Sweden from the early 1960s to the early 1980s 
or the divergence of wages since then. Swedish economists tend to 
emphasise the occurrence of a structural shift when wage bargaining 
became more decentralised in the mid-1980s. But it remains to compare 
this explanation with one that stresses the effects of larger profit 
differentials  per se. Wage relations may have widened through the 
combined effect of macroeconomic shocks (inter alia devaluations and 
depreciations of the SEK) and growing difficulties for wage earners to 
compensate for wage drift (primarily through higher unemployment). 
The explanation accords with the Rehn-Meidner description of the wage 
process in a ‘free’ market system. 
 
3.1.4.  The relevance of the efficiency-wage theory 
 
The indications of a stable positive relationship between independent 
profits and dependent wages (see above) may confirm the efficiency-wage 
theory rather than the rent-sharing and Rehn-Meidner (X-inefficiency) 
theories. But the rent-sharing interpretation is favoured in the empirical 




efficiency-wage hypothesis about a reciprocal positive relationship 
between profits and wages.   
  On the other hand, the efficiency wage theory has been verified by 
field studies and experiments (see Bewley, 1998, Agell, 1999, F144-
F147, Agell and Lundborg, 1999, Fehr and Falk, 1998, and Fehr, 
Kirchsteiger and Riedl, 1993). The studies are primarily concerned with 
the question of downward wage rigidity, where firms avoid absolute 
wage reductions for fear that wage cuts will induce unproductive 
behaviour. Besides, the empirical results are often seen as a confirmation 
of the fair wage-effort hypothesis. Hence, there is seldom any discussion 
of the wage effects of relative-wage preferences per se, i.e. without any 
reference to work morale,
44 or of the possibility that employers’ 
acceptance of such preferences might reflect an inefficient behaviour.  
  More elaborate interviews and experiments are needed to discriminate 
between competitive and non-competitive wage theories, but also 
between the efficiency wage and X-inefficiency theories. A field study 
may show that firms’ willingness and ability to pay ‘fair wages’ are 
raised by high actual profits. The observation is compatible with the 
efficiency wage theory but also with the X-inefficiency theory. The 
difficulty is to decide  which theory is the most relevant one. A 
complication here is that higher rewards to employees aimed at 
establishing more harmonious labour relations can be viewed as 
measures to raise productivity but also as an indication of production 
slack. In any event, the declaration that the efficiency wage theory is 
more valid than other wage theories would be too hasty.  
 
 
3.2.  The relation between wage drift and collective wage 
increases 
 
Proposition 2: Collective wage formation is secondary to competitive 
wage formation even in countries with strong trade unions. 
 
Central wage increases are a positive function of wage drift in the Rehn-
Meidner model. Wage drift in turn is determined by labour market 
conditions. The model does not exclude a converse relationship between 
wage drift and collective agreements that may be either positive or 
negative. Collective wage increases may contribute to a wage-wage 
spiral if relative wage preferences prevail or lead to lower wage drift if 
                                                 




the reduction in actual profits is decisive. However, the positive effect of 
wage drift on centrally negotiated wages is the predominant one in the 
Rehn-Meidner model. 
  Bargaining theorists often neglect competitive forces in wage 
formation. But they seem to be important, even in ‘corporate’ countries 
such as Sweden. Wage drift accounts for about half the total post-war 
increases in blue-collar workers’ wages in Swedish manufacturing 
(Calmfors and Forslund, 1990, pp. 91-92, Holmlund and Zetterberg, 
1991, p. 1012, and Nilsson, 1994, p. 9).  
  There are bargaining (and trade union) theories that take wage drift 
into account. A basic assumption here is that the relationship between 
central wage agreements and wage drift is negative. One explanation is 
that high (anticipated) wage drift is deducted in central wage 
negotiations. Another explanation is that wage drift is the market’s 
correction of central agreements. Significant central wage increases will, 
at least partially, be compensated by lower wage drift since excess 
demand situations become less likely. However, the interest in relative 
wages will tend to act as a counterweight. High central wage increases 
will, all else being equal, result in greater wage drift. The assumption 
must be made that wage drift and collective wage increases are 
distributed unevenly among wage earners with different skills or 
workplaces (Holmlund and Skedinger, 1990, and Calmfors, 1993a, pp. 
64-65). 
  Thus, in the bargaining theory, wage drift is not a stimulus to central 
wage increases as in the Rehn-Meidner model. On the contrary, wage 
drift has a negative impact on central wages. The relationship may even 
be the converse in bargaining models, that  wage drift is determined by 
collective wage agreements. The Rehn-Meidner model does not exclude 
such a converse relationship. Besides, the models share in common that 
the effects of central wage increases on wage drift are ambiguous and 
that the positive effects are explained by relative wage preferences. The 
suggested mechanisms behind a negative relationship are different, 
however. In the bargaining theory, central wage increases are considered in 
individual negotiations. In the Rehn-Meidner model, high central wages 
will reduce the financial possibilities for firms to compete for labour or 
their willingness to offer undeserved wage increases to individuals.
45 
  The theoretical differences between the Rehn-Meidner model and 
                                                 
45 However, the theory that wage drift is a market adjustment to the results of central 
negotiations is compatible with the Swedish model. The model emphasises that 





modern bargaining theory can be used as a reference point for a survey 
of empirical studies on wage formation in Sweden. Schager’s 
econometric study of wage formation in Swedish manufacturing shows 
that the wage increases set out in central agreements are determined by 
the previous year’s wage drift (Schager, 1988a and 1988b). The study 
thus confirms the Rehn-Meidner model’s dynamic description of the 
Swedish labour market.
46 
  Other studies have produced different conclusions. According to a 
study by Robert J. Flanagan, wage drift had no effect at all on central 
agreements in Sweden in 1964-1983 (Flanagan, 1990). A study very 
similar to Flanagan’s carried out by Douglas A. Hibbs and Håkan 
Locking even uncovered a negative relationship in 1972-1982. 
Negotiated wage increases in the area covered by LO-SAF agreements 
were one per cent higher when wage drift fell by one per cent. This 
relationship was stronger than all other relationships in the central wage 
equation (Hibbs and Locking, 1991).  
  The Flanagan and Hibbs-Locking studies are not based on a dynamic 
model like Schager’s. The simultaneous occurrence of a low level of 
wage drift and large central wage increases may reflect that the latter is 
caused by high wage drift in an earlier period. Besides, the absence of a 
positive relationship between independent wage drift and dependent 
central wage increases in the Flanagan and Hibbs-Locking studies can be 
explained by the inclusion of different labour market indicators in the 
central wage equations (Flanagan, 1990, pp. 405-407, and Hibbs and 
Locking, 1991, table 1a). According to the Rehn-Meidner model, the 
most important cause of wage drift is the labour market situation. 
  Bertil Holmlund’s and Per Skedinger’s study of regional wage drift in 
the Swedish wood industry shows that high negotiated wage increases are 
compensated by moderate wage drift (Holmlund and Skedinger, 1990).
47 
These results were confirmed by Hibbs’ and Locking’s aggregate study of 
wage drift in the LO-SAF area (Hibbs and Locking, 1991, table 1b).  
  The Rehn-Meidner model does not preclude that high collective wage 
increases may reduce the pace of wage drift.
48 But it remains to be 
                                                 
46 In Schager’s study, there was not even a significant effect of centrally negotiated 
wage increases on wage drift or of profit margins on central wage increases in the 
same period (quarter) (Schager, 1988b, pp. 22 and 27-28). Such relationships are 
possible, although not fundamental, in the Rehn-Meidner model. 
 
47 Relative wage preferences were considered in Holmlund’s and Skedinger’s study. 
Wage drift in the Swedish wood industry was a positive function of wages in the 
sector or alternatively, in the industry as a whole in the region (real wages after tax). 
 




investigated whether the underlying mechanism is the one in the model 
or the one in the bargaining theory.  
  The econometric studies presented above illustrate the difficulties of 
discriminating between the bargaining-theory and Rehn-Meidner views 
of wage formation. The difficulties arise from the fact that labour market 
conditions are important determinants of central wages in bargaining 
models but of both wage drift, which sets the framework for central 
wage negotiations, and of collective labour strength in the Rehn-Meidner 
model. Such difficulties can only be reduced by the use of a dynamic 
regression model. Schager’s study is probably based on less reliable data 
compared with later studies. But my preliminary assessment is that his 
model is the most reasonable one for Sweden and that empirical studies 




3.3.  Is labour market policy inflationary? 
 
Proposition 3: Labour market policy is less inflationary than an 
expansive economic policy to achieve full employment. 
 
In the early 1990s, there was a heated debate among Sweden’s 
economists about the effects of labour market policy on (real or product) 
wages and prices (see e.g. Calmfors and Holmlund, 1991, and Bergström 
and Löfgren, 1991). Most studies of Sweden indicate that wage increases 
are higher in a situation where a fall in labour demand is countered by 
measures introduced by the Labour Market Board (AMS) than one 
where there is an increase in open unemployment. (Holmlund, 1990, 
Calmfors and Forslund, 1990, and Calmfors, 1993a). 
  The critics of labour market policy emphasised that the programmes, 
considered as near substitutes to regular employment, would raise wage 
claims by individuals or trade unions—participators in labour market 
programmes may gain higher economic compensation (and intangible 
benefits) than unemployed persons. Participation in a programme rather 
                                                                                                                                     
collective wage increases have a stronger effect on wage drift than labour market 
conditions. However, the impact of labour market conditions on wage drift is 
probably underestimated in the Hibbs-Locking study by their inclusion of a central-
wage variable. Besides, the study may have captured a correlation rather than a 
causality (see the comments on the central-wage functions above.) 
 
49 Studies showing that the competitive sector, not the sheltered one (including the 
public sector), is the wage leader in Sweden offers an indirect support to proposition 




than being unemployed may also reduce the intensity of job search. In 
bargaining and trade union models, the reduction in welfare losses from 
being laid off and the weakening of search efforts will lead to upward 
shifts in the wage-setting curve.
50  
  Economists who maintain that labour market policy is inflationary have 
been criticised for their failure to regard the considerable variation between 
different measures and between different groups in the labour market; relief 
work (and passive assistance) is indeed inflationary unless accompanied by 
temporal and spatial limitations. But measures targeting  marginal  groups 
(women, older people, young people and people with occupational 
handicaps) and the long-term unemployed appear to have an insignificant 
effect (or no effect at all) on the rate of inflation (SOU, 1993:43, Ch. 7).  
  In fact, the critics of labour market policies admit, on both theoretical 
and empirical  grounds, that the wage-raising effects from some labour 
market programmes, for example retraining and targeting measures, may 
be weak or even negative (Forslund, 1994b, Calmfors and Skedinger, 
1995, and Calmfors, 1995). They have presented labour market policy 
models showing that the effects on both labour-demand and wage-setting 
functions are ambiguous (Calmfors and Skedinger, 1995, pp. 94-97). In 
Sweden, the economic compensation for retraining schemes is equal to 
unemployment compensation for trade union members. In consequence, 
welfare losses of being laid off are not avoided by participating in 
training programmes, which will maintain the incentives for wage 
moderation. However, the critics maintain on empirical grounds that 
labour market policy as a whole serves to push up wages, although with 
the reservation that all studies of Sweden have not shown a significant 
relationship (Calmfors and Forslund, 1993 and Forslund, 1994a).
51 The 
critics’ view is supported by a study of (product) wages in the 1965-1998 
period, particularly if the total number of participators in labour market 
                                                 
50 From a search-model perspective, labour-market programmes will alleviate wage 
competition by reducing the number of job applicants or the intensity of job search 
(cf. Schager, 1988b).  
 
51 A pooled cross-section and time series analysis of wage drift for blue-collar 
workers in Swedish engineering industry did not show a positive relationship 
between relief work and wages. Moreover, labour market training programmes have 
led to a significant decrease in wage drift (Edin, Holmlund and Östros, 1994). No 
definite answer was given to the question of why the study gave another empirical 
picture than other studies. Moreover, the suggested explanations as to why wage 
pressure is moderated by manpower training programmes are hardly convincing (see 
Edin et al., 1994, pp. 22-24).  The skill-enhancing effects of labour market training 




programmes is related to the number of persons in the labour force 
without regular jobs (Johansson, Lundborg and Zetterberg, 1999, pp. 54-
62). 
  The Rehn-Meidner model does not dispute that labour market policy 
results in higher wages when compared with an open unemployment 
situation. The policy creates a labour shortage and therefore counteracts 
its own tendency to limit the rate of wage increase through greater 
mobility in the labour market. In fact, the dominance of the labour 
shortage effect on wages is a necessary condition to keep the profit share 
down in the medium term. 
  A possible defence of the Swedish model is that selective measures 
are less inflationary than general measures to raise aggregate demand 
(see proposition 3). Labour market policy may be inflationary in itself 
but it results in lower pay rises and inflation than does a Keynesian 
policy aimed at achieving full employment. 
  Studies of (product) wages in Sweden have actually been carried out 
on the effects of labour market policy compared with regular 
employment. In one of the studies it was assumed that labour market 
policy creates higher wage increases than an increase in regular 
employment (for  instance through  an increase in aggregate demand). 
Labour market policy measures result in an immediate fall in open 
unemployment while a rapid change from unemployment to regular 
employment is prevented by the lack of mobility and information in the 
labour market. Higher frictional unemployment because of an increase in 
aggregate employment has a decisive effect on wage development, unlike 
the stimuli of labour market flexibility related to labour market policy. 
The study shows that open unemployment has a strongly negative effect 
and labour market policy a strongly positive effect on wages (Calmfors 
and Forslund, 1991). 
  The explanation above as to why labour market policy programmes 
are more inflationary than regular employment is a bit strained. Further, 
tests of wage equations with open unemployment and labour market 
policy as independent variables are beset by a series of problems due to 
reciprocal relationships between the variables. (Labour market policy 
measures may reduce unemployment but are also induced by 
unemployment.) Some of the problems could have been avoided in the 
study above if indicators of aggregate demand had been included in the 
wage equation. This kind of study would probably have demonstrated a 
positive relationship between aggregate employment and wages and a 
weaker positive relationship between labour market policy and wages 




But more important, the Rehn-Meidner model is not really challenged by 
studies that reject proposition 3. Rehn and Meidner did not deny that 
labour market policy could be at least as inflationary as an expansive 
general economic policy to obtain full employment. Their recommen-
dation was to combine labour market policy with a restrictive fiscal 
policy. The central question is whether this policy mixture to attain full 
employment without inflation is more effective than a strategy where an 
expansive economic policy is combined with price controls and incomes 
policy measures. The qualification of proposition 3 below unveils the 
real core of the Rehn-Meidner inflation theory. 
 
Proposition 3’: The combination of labour market policy and a 
restrictive general economic policy will result in a better trade-off 
between employment and inflation than the combination of an expansive 
general economic policy and incomes policy. 
 
Proposition 3’ is a reasonable one from the viewpoint of modern econo-
mics. However, no systematic attempts have been made to test this hypo-
thesis. Sweden would have been a good test case since the country has 
experienced radical switches between the two policy strategies in the 
post-war period.  
  The Swedish experience in the light of proposition 3’ is discussed in 
Erixon (2000). My cautious conclusion here is that the Swedish case has 
not refuted the Rehn-Meidner view that the combination of labour 
market policy measures and a restrictive general economic policy result 
in a better trade-off between inflation and unemployment than the strate-
gy of expansive general economic policy together with incomes policy. 
But proposition 3’ must be tested more rigorously. For instance,  both 
aggregate demand and the character and size of labour market program-
mes must be considered, together with dummy income-policy variables, 
when wages and employment are determined in quantitative studies. 
 
 
3.4.  Wage equality and the emergence of wage-wage spirals 
 
Proposition 4: Wage-wage spirals tend to be mitigated by solidaristic 
wage policies in the long run. 
 
Rehn and Meidner did discuss the possibility that solidaristic wage 
policy could speed up a wage-wage spiral (Rehn, 1952, pp. 31-42). But 




of relative wages, would weaken the wage-wage race both between trade 
unions and between ‘wage drifters’ and other wage earners. The 
proposition  that inflationary wage races will slow down because of a 
centrally determined and generally accepted policy of fair wages is one 
of the most controversial elements in the Rehn-Meidner theory. 
  Swedish empirical studies have not been based on a hypothesis that 
wage drift is curbed by solidaristic wage policy. Instead, there are 
several arguments for a positive relationship between solidaristic wage 
policy and wage drift. One argument is that central agreements of ‘fair 
wages’ are disavowed per se by groups that will suffer losses in terms of 
relative wages. Any political compression of the wage structure will 
therefore be neutralised by compensatory wage drift. Another argument 
is that wage drift will restore the market-determined wage relations that 
have been disturbed by solidaristic wage policy. (The last argument can, 
in fact, be found in the Swedish model itself, see section 1.2.) A similar 
argument is that co-ordinated trade unions will permit (and anticipate) 
some departures from solidaristic wage policy in terms of wage drift. 
Wage earners in demand (skilled labour in particular) will then receive a 
higher welfare level, which will strengthen their incentives to stay in the 
union (Uddén-Jondal, 1993, ch. 5).
52 
  A number of studies of Sweden have analysed whether or not wage 
equalisation has a positive effect on wage drift. The effect has varied 
from insignificant (Flanagan, 1990, p. 408-411) to small (Tson-
Söderström and Uddén-Jondal, 1985, p. 565) to sizeable (Hibbs and 
Locking, 1991, table 1b) to large (Nilsson, 1994, which only deals with 
the paper and pulp sector.) The last two studies are perhaps the most 
reliable ones since they are based on micro-data.
53 Thus, it would seem 
that solidaristic wage policy in Sweden has in fact been inflationary.  
  But the ‘hostile’ hypotheses and the empirical studies above are not 
definite blows to proposition 4. The Rehn-Meidner model does not 
advocate any reduction of wage differentials between workers with 
                                                 
52 ‘The last two arguments are not based on any assumption of  real-wage preferences. 
Such preferences will in fact prevent both a market and a bargaining equilibrium. Wage 
earners who benefit from solidaristic wage policy will experience a welfare loss if some 
offsetting wage drift occurs and they are driven by relative-wage considerations. In 
consequence, wage drift will lead to compensatory wage claims from non-drifters’. 
53 In Nilsson (1994), compensatory wage drift was estimated to one fifth of the total 
wage increase in the Swedish paper and pulp industry in 1971-1989 (Nilsson, 1994, 
pp. 17 and 28). However, central wage increases, not wage equalisation per se, are 
the indicators of solidaristic wage policy in the study. Such wage increases are 
determined by co-ordinated wage policy measures and by wage compression in 




different (physical) marginal productivities or between jobs  that are 
experienced by workers as different (ceteris paribus). Smaller wage gaps 
between wage earners in different sectors, firms and plants (and between 
the sexes) in Sweden largely reflected a policy of equal pay for unequal 
rather than for equal work (cf. Arai, 1994); it is only the first notion of 
solidaristic wage policy that is covered by the Rehn-Meidner model. 
  One practical difficulty in the studies above is to distinguish between 
the effects of a relative-wage preference and the effects of a wage-
equalisation policy on wage distribution. Wage compensation due to 
relative wage preferences may lead to central wage increases as well as to 
more equal wages in the short run, just as with solidaristic wage policy.  
  Another difficulty in empirical studies is to separate short-run from 
long-run effects of solidaristic policy. The Rehn-Meidner model does not 
exclude that the policy will lead to higher wage drift in the short run. 
Wage drift may increase as the policy creates excess demand for ‘wage 
drifters’ and a ‘wage premium’ for firms that could have paid more (cf. 
section 1.2). But in the Rehn-Meidner model, in the end fair wages will 
weaken wage races caused by relative wage preferences. 
  It is possible to study the long-run effects of solidaristic wage policy 
in Sweden, since it has been applied during a run of two decades (the 
1960s and 1970s). The case of the Rehn-Meidner model is strengthened 
if the positive relationship between wage equalisation and wage drift in 
the studies above is weakened or even becomes negative in the period 
under study. But structural analysis of the regression coefficients has, 
where carried out, failed to demonstrate such a development (Tson-
Söderström and Uddén-Jondal, 1985, pp. 565-566). 
  Proposition 4 is probably one of the weakest links in the Rehn-
Meidner model. My main argument is not that individuals and trade 
unions are always unable to produce a consensus about fair wage 
differentials. In fact, recent experimental labour-market studies suggest 
that people are not striving for maximum pecuniary benefits, since they 
expect that they will be harmed, directly or indirectly, by other people’s 
reactions (see Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 1998, Fehr and Schmidt, 
2000, and Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000). But proposition 4 has weak 
empirical support from Swedish regression studies and it can be 
challenged by plausible theories about human behaviour when market 
forces set the rules. The proposition can perhaps be rescued by a 
qualification, anchored in the Rehn-Meidner model, saying that 
solidaristic wage policy is only inflation-dampening if combined with 
restrictive economic policy and labour market policy measures. I have 




3.5.  Solidaristic wage policy and structural change 
 
Proposition 5: Structural change will be speeded up by solidaristic wage 
policy. 
 
Pay equalisation between plants and industries was more far-reaching in 
Sweden than in other OECD countries, including the Nordic ones, in the 
1960s and the 1970s (Ohlsson, 1980, Hedström, 1982, and Hibbs and 
Locking, 1995). Market forces alone cannot explain this radical 
reduction of industrial wage gaps in Sweden. Hence, the bargaining 
system and wage policy must have been important (see 3.1).  
  A proposition 5 that the pace of structural change has accelerated 
through solidaristic wage policy in Sweden relies on at least one of three 
mechanisms in the Rehn-Meidner model. First, solidaristic wage policy 
will release resources for dynamic plants, firms and sectors, primarily by 
hastening closures (with the exception of acquisitions) of unprofitable 
firms and inefficient production units.
54 Second, the policy will increase 
the incentives to structural change by widening the differences in 
profitability between plants, firms and sectors and by giving high-wage 
plants, firms and sectors a ‘wage premium’. Third, solidaristic wage 
policy will increase the number of job applicants due to dismissals and 
the higher risks of unemployment in stagnating sectors.  
  A study of closures in the textile and garment, paper and pulp, and 
engineering industries in Sweden from 1972 to 1982 showed a wide 
spread of profitability among the plants that were closed down. Hence, 
the correlation between profitability and closures seems to have been 
weak (see the first mechanism above). A weak correlation does not 
exclude a causal relation, however. The closure of units with poor 
profitability may simply have been delayed by, among other things, a 
good financial position and government subsidies (Stålhammar, 1987, 
chapter 2). But it remains to investigate whether profit squeezes in the 
analysed industries were caused by solidaristic wage policy (see below).  
                                                 
54 In both the Rehn-Meidner model and the neo-classical vintage models of Salter 
(1960) and Solow (1964), average productivity is raised by the fact that the oldest 
plants go to the wall when prices no longer cover their variable costs. One difference 
between the models is that the pressure on marginal units arises from price 
competition by new plants in vintage models, not from wage pushes and stabilisation 
policy as in the Rehn-Meidner model. Another difference is that the pressure on 
marginal units will induce (as in the X-inefficiency theory) rationalisations in 
individual plants and firms in the Rehn-Meidner model. Such units are doomed to die 





The second mechanism is rejected by the fact that differences in 
profitability between industries of Swedish manufacturing became 
smaller in 1953-1976—in a period, thus, of radical solidaristic wage 
policy (Englund, 1979, p. 175). It is true that the smaller differences in 
profitability may reflect an actual hastening of structural change, not the 
absence of a relationship between solidaristic wage policy, relative 
profitability and structural change. In fact, the importance of relative 
profitability for structural change in manufacturing (see the definition 
below) was emphasised in a study of the period 1964 to 1996; changes in 
the dispersion of profit margins were the main explanation behind (inter-
industrial) structural change. Yet, this change was in turn explained by 
shifts among industries in international competitiveness, determined by 
the relation between technological progress in domestic and foreign 
firms. The impact of solidaristic wage policy was not analysed in the 
study (Andersson, Gustafsson, and Lundberg, 1998). 
  Finally, the lay-off rates seem to have been be relatively low in the 
Swedish labour market in the post-war period  (see the third mechanism 
above). The job separation rates have not been higher in Sweden than in 
other OECD countries as would have been expected from solidaristic 
wage policy (Blanchflower, Jackman and Saint-Paul, 1995).
55  
  Hence, the three mechanisms behind a positive relationship between 
solidaristic wage policy and structural change in Sweden were not 
detected in any of the studies above. But neither have they really refuted a 
hypothesis that the mechanisms did work in Sweden in the heyday of 
solidaristic wage policy.  
  The case for proposition 5 is strengthened if structural change is 
shown to have been rapid in Sweden in the period of solidaristic wage 
policy and also more rapid in this period than in other countries. But the 
picture of industrial transformation in Sweden during the post-war period 
is split and difficult to interpret in causal terms. Inter-industrial change in 
Swedish manufacturing was speeded up in the latter part of the 1960s 
and the early 1970s. Swedish structural change was also fast in these 
periods by OECD standards. The extent of structural change is calculated 
here as an index of movements in employment between industries 
(Holmlund, 1981, pp. 69-73, Fries, 1983, pp. 143-147, Nilsson and 
Zetterberg, 1987, pp. 17-19, and Andersson et al, 1998, pp. 3-4 and 9-
10). 
   However, structural change in Swedish manufacturing in the 1960s 
and early 1970s was not impressive compared with other small 
                                                 
55 Job separation rates are determined not only by the rate of lay-off but also by the 




Western European countries including the Nordic ones. Besides, in the 
1970s, structural change in Sweden slowed down and became even 
less rapid than in large OECD countries such as West-Germany and 
the United States.  
  The studies above do not reject a hypothesis that structural change 
is hastened by solidaristic wage policy. However, structural change 
was not exceptionally strong in Sweden in the golden era of 
solidaristic wage policy particularly not in comparison with other 
countries in the Nordic area.
56  
  It is difficult to give a clear picture of Swedish structural change in the 
1980s and also to relate it to solidaristic wage policy. From 1978 to 
1988, structural change in manufacturing became more rapid in Sweden 
than in other OECD countries, including the Nordic ones but excluding 
Canada and the United States (Hansson and Lundberg, 1995, pp. 146-
148).
57 At the same time there are indications of a slower transformation 
of resources to R&D and human-capital intensive industries in Sweden 
compared with other OECD countries in the 1980s (Edquist, 1991, and 
Hansson and Lundberg, 1995, pp. 79-82). In addition, there are 
difficulties in deciding whether these indications of a relatively slow 
structural change in Sweden in the 1980s are arguments for or against 
proposition 5. In fact, they can be seen as support for the proposition 
since wage differentials became larger and wage bargaining more 
decentralised during the decade. But the tendency to larger wage gaps 
was still weak and the relation between changes in wage spread and 
structural change are hardly immediate. Besides, it seems that the 
allocation of resources to R&D and human-capital intensive industries 
accelerated in Sweden in the 1990s, thus during a decade when wage 
differentials in Sweden returned to the state of the mid-1970s (Hibbs and 
Locking, 1995, pp. 1-4).  
  One cross-section study of wage and employment developments in 
Sweden has given strong support to proposition 5. The study covers all 
two-digit sectors of the economy, including the public sector, from the 
early 1960s to the mid-1980s (Edin and Topel, 1997). Employment in an 
industry rose more in a certain period the higher the initial wage rate and 
the lower the wage increase in the same period. In manufacturing, both the 
                                                 
56 The share of finished goods in total exports increased more in Sweden than in 
other OECD countries in the 1960s and the 1970s but not in comparison with other 
Nordic countries and Canada (Horwitz, 1979, p. 43). 
  
57 Norway had the fastest structural change but the measure is ‘distorted’ by the 




correlations were stronger in 1963-1975 than in 1975-1985. Industries in 
manufacturing with high wage growth experienced low employment 
growth in 1963-1975 in the United States as well, but the correlation was 
stronger in Sweden. Besides, in the United States, there was no evidence 
at all of a positive relation between initial wages and employment growth. 
The conclusion drawn is that solidaristic wage policy has led to Swedish 
restructuring  (Edin and Topel, 1997, pp. 175-184 and 197). 
  But a similar study of the Nordic countries gave solidaristic wage 
policy a more modest role as a cause of changes in industrial 
composition and plant closures in manufacturing. The decline in relative 
production and the number of production units in industries with initially 
lower wages than the average (textile and garment, wood products) was 
not stronger in Sweden than in other Nordic countries in 1960-1973. The 
study also questions the contention that wage pressure on ‘marginal’ 
plants and stagnating sectors was brought about by wage policy and not 
by free market forces (thus by wage and job opportunities in other plants 
and sectors), possibly in conjunction with relative wage preferences. The 
cost pressure on stagnating industries was not systematically higher in 
countries with more solidaristic wage policy (Erixon, 1984, pp. 27-37). 
The study confirms the conclusions of other studies that the extent of 
solidaristic wage policy has not been decisive for differences in 
structural changes and wage developments between the Nordic countries 
(see above, and Holmlund and Zetterberg, 1992, pp. 1023-1025). 
  On the other hand, proposition 5 has been directly confirmed by a 
production-function based study of the effects of wage dispersion on 
output and productivity in the Swedish private business sector. The 
contention is that solidaristic wage policy led to a significant increase in 
aggregate output and blue-collar labour productivity by having speeded 
up the transformation of resources between plants and industries (Hibbs 
and Locking, 1995). But the limitations of the stylised theoretical 
approach are admitted in the study, one obvious weakness being that the 
effects of wage distribution are not related to other factors such as 
international competition and macroeconomic policies. 
  My tentative conclusion is that proposition 5 has not been refuted by 
empirical studies, although there are few indications that wage structure 
is a major explanation of structural change in Sweden. For instance, 
differences in structural change between the Nordic countries in the post-
war period are probably better explained by differences in 
macroeconomic policies, international competitiveness (including 
product composition), and in plant structure (size, number and age of 





Proposition 5’: Structural change may be achieved without major wage 
differences between industries. 
 
A proposition that structural change has been speeded up by solidaristic 
wage policy is not rejected above. But the proposition is too strong in 
relation to the Rehn-Meidner model. The model simply says that 
structural change is possible with solidaristic wage policy and that other 
adjustment mechanisms are less preferable from the viewpoint of income 
distribution and price stability. However, to obtain the same 
transformation of resources as in a ‘free’ labour market, the solidaristic 
wage policy requires the support of labour market policy. 
  I will therefore define a weaker proposition 5’ saying that structural 
change is possible without large wage differences between sectors and 
industries. This proposition assumes that the wage structure is 
unimportant for structural change or that wage equalisation is at least as 
efficient as large wage differentials for generating a transformation of 
resources between sectors.  
  Proposition 5’ gets stronger support from the empirical studies above 
than proposition 5. I will directly confront proposition 5’ with some 
Swedish studies that explicitly emphasise the negative structural effects 
of solidaristic wage policy. But to begin with let me repeat that the 
Rehn-Meidner model is not hit by the criticism that Swedish growth has 
been hampered by the convergence of wages between individuals with 
different competencies and educational levels. 
  A study based on panel data (for 1984 and 1986) concludes in 
opposition to the Rehn-Meidner model that wage incentives are 
important for labour mobility (Björklund and Holmlund, 1989). Most 
people who voluntarily leave a company go to better-paid jobs. The 
model is not valid in this respect since it says that wage differentials are 
a blunt instrument for bringing about mobility in the labour market  
  The Swedish study does not answer the question of whether people 
had to get higher wages in order to change jobs. All that is demonstrated 
is a link between change of workplace and a higher wage. But more 
important, the Rehn-Meidner model does not deny that labour mobility 
can be achieved by large wage differentials. It does reject this kind of 
adjustment mechanism, however, maintaining that it is unfair and 
inflationary. It must also be remembered that solidaristic wage policy 
will result in stronger incentives to structural change by reinforcing 
profit differentials between sectors.  




radical wage equalisation. (External labour mobility varied with the 
business cycle in the 1970s and the 1980s.) Any tendency towards lower 
labour mobility through smaller wage differences or other factors 
(double-income households etc.) appear to have been counteracted, inter 
alia, by labour-market and educational policy. Flexibility in the labour 
market is not lower in Sweden compared with other industrialised 
countries, even though Sweden has a more even wage structure (cf. 
Nilsson and Zetterberg, 1987, and Faxén, Odhner and Spånt, 1988, pp. 
248-251). Regional mobility seems to have been higher in the United 
States than in Western European countries, including Sweden, in the 
1970s. But the higher degree of regional mobility in the United State is 
explained by greater job opportunities, not by the larger wage 
differentials (Nilsson and Zetterberg, 1987, pp. 35-52).  
  Besides, the Beveridge curve, i.e. the product between the number of 
vacancies and the number of unemployed (in relation to the labour force) 
was more favourable for Sweden than for all other OECD countries in 
the 1970s and the 1980s. The Beveridge curve did actually shift inward 
in Sweden during those decades, which was not the case in most other 
OECD countries. The Swedish shift has been attributed to labour market 
policy and centralised wage bargaining (Jackman, Pissarides and Savori, 
1990, pp. 477-483).  
  An influential argument in the Swedish debate is that solidaristic wage 
policy has prevented a renewal of Swedish industry. Dynamic new firms 
have died at an early age because of solidaristic wage policy, without 
having reached their potential profit levels. Further, solidaristic wage 
policy is said to have favoured large, established firms that could have 
paid more than the wages of solidarity. In total, solidaristic wage policy 
has been accused of having preserved an outdated industrial structure 
with negative consequences for Sweden’s growth performance (Davis 
and Henrekson, 1997, pp. 354 and 376-377). 
  The argument that solidaristic wage policy has made Swedish 
industry obsolete seems reasonable. In the mid-1970s, non-agricultural 
self-employment as a proportion of total civilian employment in 
Sweden fell below the level of all other OECD countries. Swedish 
export and manufacturing (production) were, and still are, dominated 
by large, established firms, even by international standards (Erixon, 
1997b, pp. 17 and 83). 
  No systematic study has yet been made of the relationship between 
solidaristic wage policy and entrepreunership in Sweden. It seems, 
however, that the ‘mature’ industrial structure of Sweden was formed 




wage policy (Erixon, 1997b, pp. 25-28). The policy may have 
reinforced the large-firm character of Swedish industry in the 1960s 
and the 1970s. But the strong concentration of firms in Sweden in the 
post-war years is probably better explained by the openness of the 
economy, the character of risk-capital markets, profit taxes, and by 
public sector growth.  
  To summarise, a hypothesis that structural change is possible without 
large wage differentials has not been convincingly challenged by the 
empirical literature. However, I cannot decide with certainty whether 
solidaristic wage policy has speeded up structural change (see 
proposition 5), whether the policy’s positive and negative effects on 
structural change have cancelled each other out, or whether in fact wage 
equalisation has had no significant effect at all on sector and company 
composition in Sweden. 
 
 
3.6.  Transformation pressure and growth 
 
Proposition 6: Economic growth is stimulated by low profitability levels. 
 
The theory of solidaristic wage policy is a partial theory of trans-
formation pressure. ‘Marginal’ firms (and plants) are forced to 
rationalise in order to survive. A general theory of transformation 
pressure is equally rooted in the Rehn-Meidner growth model although 
the model is primarily concerned with production and productivity levels 
rather than with growth. Solidaristic policy actually lessens 
transformation pressure on firms with high historical levels of 
profitability. This threatens to preserve the structure of industry and 
disrupt the process of change within the profitable firms themselves.  
  Low profitability on average may reflect that aggregate demand is 
low, that unit costs are high or that competition is intense. Profits are 
squeezed in all sectors in the Rehn-Meidner model by a tight general 
economic policy in the short run and by a selective policy of full 
employment in the medium and long term. A possible hypothesis in the 
model is that structural change and measures to lift up productivity in 
individual production units, firms and industries will be speeded up by 
low profits in general (see proposition 6).  
  In the ‘structural’ case, a reduction in overall profits will eliminate 
firms (and vintages) with low productivity levels. Average productivity 
will increase both per se and by the allocation of resources to firms and 




decrease in an industry may lead to mergers to exploit scale advantages. 
Further, low profits may speed up firms’ own rationalisations.  
  The existence of production slacks in firms is emphasised in the 
theory of X-inefficiencies. The Rehn-Meidner model and the theory of 
X-inefficiencies can both be extended to consider other sources of 
productivity increases in firms than rationalisations. A stronger external 
pressure on firms may stimulate the development of new products, 
technologies and work organisations (cf. Leibenstein, 1980, chapter 3). 
  The Rehn-Meidner growth model implicitly assumes (as Keynesian 
growth theories) that macroeconomic imbalances, caused for instance by 
separate stabilisation policy measures, can be lengthy. Here, Rehn and 
Meidner can refer to rigidities in labour markets but also to relative wage 
preferences, which will delay (or even prevent) a full adjustment of 
nominal wages to changes in aggregate demand. The assumption of 
lengthy imbalances therefore seems reasonable. For instance, it took 
almost a decade before the profits from devaluation policies in Sweden 
in the early 1980s were eliminated by nominal wage increases 
(Lindbeck, 1993, pp. 81-82. See also Bosworth and Lawrence, 1987, pp. 
52-53). 
  There is no scope in Keynesian growth theories for such a notion as 
transformation pressure. Keynesian economists in general deny a 
negative relationship between profits and economic growth (Erixon, 
1987, pp. 25-27, and Erixon, 1991, pp. 247-249). They claim that 
investment and production growth are stimulated by high profits and 
high aggregate demand through the importance of self-finance and the 
‘accelerator mechanism’ where investments are a positive function of 
capacity utilisation (or production growth). Productivity will be 
stimulated as well if static economies of scale prevail or if the 
accelerator is associated with new techniques (dynamic economies of 
scale). Proposition 6 has been rejected by many time-series and cross-
country studies showing—in accordance with the Keynesian view—that 
high demand and profits have a positive effect on investments as well as 
on productivity growth, at least on aggregate levels (Michl, 1985, 
Maddison, 1987, Erixon, 1987, pp. 202-210, and Erixon, 1994, pp. 42-52). 
  But the low productivity growth in most OECD countries during the 
boom of the 1980s cannot be explained in terms of low demand and 
profits. In fact, there was no significant positive relationship between 
profit shares and productivity growth in Swedish manufacturing as a 
whole during the boom (Erixon, 1991, pp. 364-369). Further, growth 
studies are often too aggregate, hiding that some industries may rather 




(Keynesian) relationship between profits and demand on the one hand 
and growth on the other is often overestimated in time series analyses 
because of simultaneity problems—high growth may result in high 
profits and activity levels. The theory of transformation pressure is also 
disfavoured by the fact that a negative relationship is probably more 
delayed than a positive relationship and therefore more difficult to catch 
in quantitative terms. 
  But there is empirical support for a hypothesis that Swedish growth has 
been stimulated by transformation pressure. High productivity growth in 
manufacturing in the 1960s is explained largely by mergers and, in raw 
materials industries, by the fact that plants with low productivity growth 
were eliminated (Rydén, 1971, and Wohlin, 1970). These mergers and 
closures in raw materials industries were primarily caused by harder 
international competition and recessions. The potential for mergers and 
the differences in productivity between marginal and best plants were 
large in the 1960s due to a weak transformation pressure in the preceding 
decade (cf. Rydén, 1971, pp. 198-206, and Wohlin, 1970, p. 109). 
  The importance of economic policy (and solidaristic wage policy) for 
transformation pressure was toned down in the Swedish studies above. 
Yet, explaining the country’s relatively low productivity growth in the 
1980s in terms of a weak transformation pressure, some Swedish 
economists focused on economic policy. Devaluation policies were 
accused of having delayed structural change, rationalisations and the 
introduction of new organisations and products in manufacturing 
(Erixon, 1991, and Produktivitetsdelegationen, 1992).  The conclusions 
were based on some approximate evidence, but also on the results of 
time series analysis. Profit variables were here included as determinants 
(together with other variables) of labour productivity in Swedish 
manufacturing in 1957-1987. It was possible to demonstrate for 
manufacturing as a whole that profits had a (delayed) negative effect on 
labour productivity in accordance with the theory of transformation 
pressure. Several industries on the two- and three-digit levels, 
particularly the machine, pulp and paper industries, showed a similar 
negative relationship between profits and productivity (Erixon, 1991, pp. 
349-356).  
  The theory of transformation pressure is partly confirmed by 
productivity developments in Swedish manufacturing in the 1990s. Only 
Finland had a higher labour productivity growth than Sweden among the 
OECD countries. The exceptional productivity growth in Sweden in the 
first half of the 1990s is largely explained by rationalisations, although 




and—although to a lesser degree—by the elimination of ‘marginal’ 
production units (Kvarnström, 1995). Rationalisations in manufacturing 
were induced by the deep Swedish recession in the early 1990s and due 
to the weak transformation pressure in the 1980s, much room was also 
provided for productivity gains.  
  However, the high productivity growth in Sweden in the 1990s cannot 
fully explained by the theory of transformation pressure. Fiscal policy 
was mainly tight but there was a strong depreciation of the SEK and 
therefore, a dramatic increase in the profit share in Swedish manufac-
turing in the first half of the decade. 
  Empirical studies offer no general support to a hypothesis that 
economic growth is promoted by profit squeezes. But the categorical 
proposition 6 gives no representative picture of the Rehn-Meidner 
model. Rehn and Meidner realised that pressure on profitability could 
seriously curb private investments, particularly by restricting the 
possibilities of self-finance. I shall therefore formulate a proposition 6’ 
that takes account of the Rehn-Meidner view that economic growth can 
be hampered by a hard transformation pressure. 
 
Proposition 6’: Profit levels have an ambiguous effect on economic 
growth. 
 
Proposition 6’ accords better with the empirical literature than the 
stronger proposition 6. A hypothesis that growth is stimulated by a 
harder transformation pressure is not valid for all industries and periods. 
There are counter-balancing forces at work in individual industries. 
Further, the aggregate relation between profits and growth can change 
over time because of shifts in technology and in industry and investment 
composition. 
  A relative theory of transformation pressure is also supported by 
industrial economics where the relationship between market-structure 
conditions and innovations (or R&D expenditures) are focused upon. 
Competition is only innovative up to a certain level in some industries, 
inter alia due to scale advantages in R&D activities and the financial 
importance of past profits for R&D investments (Erixon, 1998). My 
conclusion is that the mild version of the Rehn-Meidner growth theory 







4.  The Core and Future of the Rehn-Meidner Model 
 
The Swedish model, synonymous here with the Rehn-Meidner model, 
represents a unique policy in combining full employment and equity 
with growth and price stability. The combination is achieved by a wage 
policy of solidarity and the use of selective instruments—primarily 
labour market policies and marginal employment premiums—within the 
framework of a restrictive general economic policy. 
  I referred in the introduction to the common view in Sweden today 
that the Rehn-Meidner model is obsolete. The main argument is that 
internationalisation has narrowed the scope for an economic policy that 
aims to keep down the general level of profits. The Rehn-Meidner model 
was conceived for an economy with small movements of capital over 
national borders. Furthermore, overseas production by companies was 
less extensive and less interchangeable with domestic production than is 
the case today. Internationalisation is also said to have narrowed the 
scope for solidaristic wage policy. Wage earners in high demand who are 
hit by the fair-wage principle have greater opportunities today of moving 
to other countries. The argument assumes that the road is long to co-
ordinated wage policy actions on an international level. 
  Internationalisation has undeniably limited the possibilities of any 
single country to apply the Rehn-Meidner model. But it is too early to 
pronounce the model dead. The Swedish model of economic policy has 
silently sneaked in by the back door in the 1990s, both in Sweden and in 
the EU. A model where full employment can only be achieved by 
selective interventionism and supply-oriented measures in labour and 
product markets is relevant in a situation where the EMU (and 
internationalisation) has reduced the room for expansive general 
economic policies in single countries. Further, the EU choice in the mid-
1990s of placing employment higher on the political agenda without 
giving up the restriction of price stability is definitely in line with the 
Rehn-Meidner model.  
  Marginal employment premiums (or similar subsidies) will increase 
the incentives for dynamic companies to locate expansion within their 
own countries. Non-subsidised companies will suffer a profit loss, 
particularly if the premiums are financed by increases in average pay-roll 
taxes. But these companies are hardly the ones that give large 
contributions to a country’s economic growth.  
  The Swedish model does not rule out wage differences between 
individuals even if the aim is to achieve fair wages rather than high 




undoubtedly receive higher wages abroad than in a country with 
solidaristic wage policy. The policy must therefore be combined with 
other policy measures to avoid the emigration of scarce labour and also 
the demise in their infancy of innovative firms that are not yet able to 
pay solidaristic wages. 
  But the focus of this work is not on the relevancy of the Swedish 
model in terms of institutional change or new priorities and means in 
economic policy. My ambition is to show the compound and unique 
character of the Swedish model of economic policy and to relate its 
underlying economic theory to modern economics. 
  Theoretical developments in macroeconomics since the 1970s have 
confirmed basic assumptions of the Rehn-Meidner model. The 
scepticism to Keynesian fine-tuning in the model and its reliance on 
supply-side and adjustment measures in labour and goods markets to 
obtain high employment levels and price stability are shared by 
influential economists today. These similarities may seem paradoxical to 
people who, correctly, have noticed the importance of the art of social 
engineering and the strategic role of trade unions in the Swedish model. 
  Yet, the Swedish model refutes salient elements of modern 
macroeconomics. The model does not advocate real-wage flexibility to 
obtain macroeconomic balance. The designers of the model had doubts 
about the possibilities of avoiding imbalances through real wage 
flexibility but they emphasised the negative effects on inflation, income 
distribution and growth.  
  The Rehn-Meidner model gives two valuable contributions to positive 
economics; the first one concerns the analysis of wage formation in a 
country like Sweden. Rehn and Meidner laid strong emphasis on 
relative-wage preferences long before the birth of the modern theory of 
fair wages. But more important, their dynamic and comprehensive 
description of the (Swedish) wage process is richer than that found in 
most wage models today. In the Rehn-Meidner model, wages are 
determined by both competitive forces, X-inefficient firms, and by wage-
setting phenomena such as labour market policy, solidaristic wage policy 
and relative wage preferences. Bargaining and trade union theorists in 
particular tend to underestimate the role of competitive labour markets 
both per se and as guidelines for collective wage negotiations.  
  The second contribution of the Rehn-Meidner model to positive 
economics is in the field of growth economics. The model was not only a 
forerunner of X-inefficiency and vintage theories by assuming that 
productivity is stimulated by profit-margin squeezes. It has also paved 




pressure in terms of wage and stabilisation policy.  
  My essay ends with a test of six propositions that are often connected 
with the Swedish model. The propositions, concerning the performance 
of economic and wage policy and the driving forces behind wages, 
inflation and growth, have been related to modern economic theories. 
Further, their validity has been evaluated by a survey of the empirical 
literature with an eye on Sweden in particular. Three of the six propo-
sitions have been modified to give a more representative picture of the 
Rehn-Meidner model. 
  The Rehn-Meidner hypothesis of a positive relation between 
profitability and wages (no. 1) has not been overthrown by the empirical 
literature. It is true that the relationship is weak in Sweden but this 
confirms the Swedish theoretical view that wage policy matters. 
  The proposition that collective wage increases are basically 
determined by wage drift and not the other way around (no. 2) has not 
been verified by all studies. But I have opted to give precedence to 
Swedish studies that support the proposition. 
  The Rehn-Meidner model does not deny that labour market 
programmes can be inflationary, and not even that the programmes may 
be more inflationary than an expansionary general economic policy. A 
correct interpretation of the model is the proposition that the 
combination of a lax fiscal policy and incomes policy is more 
inflationary than a tight fiscal policy in combination with labour market 
policy measures (no. 3’). The hypothesis has not yet attracted the interest 
of applied economics. 
  The Swedish model does not claim that structural change is speeded 
up by solidaristic wage policy, only that structural change is possible 
with the policy (no. 5’). This reformulated, weaker proposition is 
confirmed by most Swedish studies. 
  A proposition that profits and profit margins have an uncertain effect 
on economic growth (no. 6’) gives a more representative picture of the 
Swedish model than a straight one saying that growth is always stimula-
ted by a profit squeeze. The milder proposition is supported by the empi-
rical literature. 
  A proposition that solidaristic wage policy will mitigate inflation (no. 
4) has been rejected by Swedish studies. The underlying theory is one of 
the weakest links in the Swedish model. The model can perhaps be 
defended by reference to the fact that a policy of fair wage differentials 
has not been applied in Sweden. A possible reply is that it is hardly 
possible to reproduce a long-run equilibrium in labour markets or to 




in a ‘corporate’ country like Sweden. 
  The tests of propositions in the Swedish model show the model in a 
relatively favourable light. But they have also raised some fundamental 
objections to the model’s underpinning economic theory. It may seem 
inconsistent to give market forces a decisive role in wage formation that, 
for example, makes incomes policy impossible, and to expect at the same 
time that wages can be regulated by solidaristic wage policy. From the 
angle of the Swedish model, it seems difficult to control market forces 
by such regulations even if they have the aim of simulating a competitive 
labour market in equilibrium. 
  There is definitely some truth in these objections. But again, it is 
necessary to emphasise the coherent nature of the model. It is impossible 
to lift out some parts of the model and keep the rest. A solidaristic wage 
policy cannot be applied without a restrictive general economic policy 
and a mobility-enhancing labour market policy. The Swedish model is 
still a possible lodestar for economic policy, particularly on inter-
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The macroeconomic principles behind the Swedish model were deve-
loped by two trade union economists, Gösta Rehn and Rudolf Meidner,
shortly after World War II. The model’s economic and wage policy
represents a unique third way between keynesianism and monetarism
in its approach to combine full employment and growth with price
stability and equity. This essay describes the content and economic
foundation of the Rehn-Meidner model and evaluates its relevancy in
the light of later theoretical and empirical work. The model is unique
in terms of its comprehensive view of economic policy – the means
proposed have more than one goal, and also the aim of making other
instruments in the model more effective. With some exceptions, the
economic theory of the model remains valid by being in harmony with
modern thinking about employment, inflation and growth or by
offering a vital alternative to the prevailing views. The model’s main
contribution to economics is its dynamic description of wage forma-
tion, giving room for both competitive forces, labour market policy,
inefficient firms and preferences for ‘fair wages’. The model also makes
a valuable contribution to modern growth economics by incorporating
the idea that structural change and company productivity can be
promoted by profit squeezes induced by wage and economic policy.